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THE LIMITATION OF ANIMAL PROTECTION FOR 
RELIGIOUS OR CULTURAL REASONS 
Olivier Le Bot∗ 
The relationship between the animal protection and the respect of 
tradition is an important issue in Animal law. The question is examined 
from a perspective which is both empirical and comparative. The case-law 
of several countries and legal systems have been taken into account: 
United-States, Israel, Poland, Brazil, European Court of Human Rights, 
International Court of Justice. In the light of the courts decisions, it 
appears that, tradition tends to prevail over protection when a religious 
tradition is at stake. However, when a superior norm of protection is 
invoked, this usually leads to an overruling of a regulation or a legislation 
allowing mistreatment of animals. 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 
I. FIRST DIMENSION: THE LAW FORBIDS ANIMAL ABUSE COMMITTED IN THE 
NAME OF TRADITION ...................................................................................... 3 
A.  Legislation Which Protects the Sensitivity of Animals against 
Tradition Exists .............................................................................................. 3 
B.  Ritual Slaughter ............................................................................ 3 
C.  Hunting with Hounds .................................................................... 6 
II. SECOND DIMENSION: THE LAW AUTHORIZES ANIMAL ABUSE ON THE 
BASIS OF A TRADITION .................................................................................... 7 
A.  First Situation: A Superior Norm Protecting Animals Exists ....... 8 
B.  Absence of Superior Norm: The Question of a Differentiation .. 11 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 11 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern legislation concerning animal protection is justified by 
animals’ sensitivity. Since the 19th century, we have been protecting 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Public Law at Aix-Marseille University. Research fields: Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, Animal Law. 
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animals because they are sensitive beings1. 
However, it is not because animals are recognized as sensitive beings 
that they benefit ipso facto from a protection. Indeed, various considerations 
may oppose their protection. 
Economic considerations first: using or exploiting animals brings in 
money, a lot of money (for example, 75 billion euros per year, for the agri-
food industry in France2); in order not to thwart these interests, we accept 
hens confined in cages where they can not even turn around; in short, we 
allow methods of animal farming that cause suffering to animals. 
Recreational considerations may also run counter to respecting the 
sensitivity of animals (we use animals for entertainment, in bullrings, in 
zoos, in circuses, at Marineland or SeaWorld, etc.) and, because we have 
fun with them, we may deny their most fundamental ethological needs, for 
example, confining killer whales in a few cubic meters of water when they 
need to swim dozens of kilometres every day. 
Among the reasons that can justify restrictions to animal protection (or 
animal welfare), we also find (and here the author comes to his subject) 
social considerations (in a broad meaning): tradition, culture, religion. We 
do that because we have always done that (it’s tradition). Or, in our region, 
locality, culture, we do that (it’s a local or cultural tradition). Or through our 
mystical—or non rational—vision of the world, we do that (it’s a religious 
tradition). 
The legislator may take position in two different ways when faced with 
animal abuse justified by tradition. Either it accepts the abuse, it legalizes it 
(it considers this abuse legitimate and, in this case, tradition prevails over 
protection); or it chooses to prohibit the abuse, considering that protection 
must prevail over tradition. 
We could study, in detail, the considerations put forward by the 
legislator in either case to justify its choice. But it would be essentially a 
political or a sociological approach. We could also expose, in details, the 
cases when the legislator gives prevalence to tradition and cases when he 
gives prevalence to protection. But such a presentation would be static and 
would present a contingent character. 
What is interesting for the jurist, is to know whether the legislator’s 
choice can be contested. The legislator makes a political choice: giving 
                                                 
1 At least in western countries. In India, protections are based on the intrinsic value of the animal (see 
S. L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights, 18 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 283 
(1987). 
2 Figures from the French Ministry of Agriculture and the National Institute of Statistics. Available at 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=T10F181. 
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prevalence to animal protection or to tradition. Can this choice be 
questioned by the judge (on the basis of superior instruments)? 
Let’s consider the matter in its two dimensions. 
I. FIRST DIMENSION: THE LAW FORBIDS ANIMAL ABUSE COMMITTED IN THE 
NAME OF TRADITION 
A. Legislation Which Protects the Sensitivity of Animals against Tradition 
Exists 
Question: can fundamental rights be invoked in order to make tradition 
prevail over this legislation? In other words, can someone invoke a 
fundamental right in order to bring the legal order in line with his or her 
vision of the world, in such a way, that he or she can freely inflict suffering 
on an animal, in the name of tradition? 
This question is raised, very clearly, in two areas: ritual slaughtering 
and hunting with hounds. 
B. Ritual Slaughter 
Ritual slaughter, as ritual sacrifice, is a tradition, a very old tradition3. 
Both traditions cause suffering to animals. In order to drain the blood of the 
animal out of its body (so that, the animal is bloodless when it is eaten), it is 
slaughtered without prior stunning. It feels an intense pain between the 
moment bleeding starts and the moment the animal stops living. 
The case-law that I have found is largely oriented towards a protection 
of those traditions4. The accomplishment of a rite is considered as a way of 
exercising freedom of religion. Consequently, it benefits fully from the 
protection granted to this freedom5. 
                                                 
3 Their origin dates, for Jewish and Muslims, to the first sacred texts (the Torah, the Koran) and, in 
some religions, corresponds to an ancestral practice (as the case, for example, in the Santeria religion, 
that will be further explored below). 
4 The European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes of 10th May, 
1979 also provides a specific derogation for the accomplishment of religious rituals. According to 
Article 13, “In the case of the ritual slaughter of animals of the bovine species, they shall be restrained 
before slaughter by mechanical means designed to spare them all avoidable pain, suffering, agitation, 
injury or contusions”. 
5 See, for example ECHR, June 27, 2000, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, n° 27417/95, § 73: 
“Article 9 lists a number of forms which manifestation of one’s religion or belief may take, namely 
worship, teaching, practice and observance (…). It is not contested that, ritual slaughter, as indeed its 
name indicates, constitutes a rite (…), whose purpose is to provide” that animals are “slaughtered in 
accordance with religious prescriptions”. Thus this tradition is protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention, “since ritual slaughter must be considered to be covered by a right guaranteed by the 
Convention” (§ 74). 
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Three solutions can be mentioned. 
The first one is the most protective of religion (and consequently, the 
less protective of animals). It recognizes a right to practice ritual slaughter. 
It is the option adopted by the constitutional court of Austria. In 1998, the 
court considered that, an obligation to slaughter animals with anaesthesia is 
unreasonable for Muslims or Jews6. 
The situation is similar in Germany. In 2002, the court of Karlsruhe 
declared that, the law could not restrain the possibilities to practice ritual 
slaughter7. The law (the TSchG, §4) prohibits ritual slaughter. It establishes 
a general prohibition of ritual slaughter, ie without prior stunning. The law 
provides that, administrative authorities can exceptionally give permissions 
on one strict condition: when ritual slaughter is necessary to respond to the 
needs of the members of a religious community whose imperative rules 
prescribe ritual slaughter. In 1999, a Muslim butcher filed a lawsuit to an 
administrative Court after authorities had refused him permission to practice 
ritual slaughter. In 2002, the constitutional Court of Karlsruhe concluded to 
a violation of the butcher’s freedom of work and of his customers’ freedom 
of religion. For the Court, the law, which has an inferior value, cannot 
legally restrain these fundamental rights, because (as the Court underlines) 
the protection of animals does not have a constitutional value. The situation 
has not changed since 2002 when a constitutional goal of animal protection 
was introduced (Art. 20 a). In 2006, the Federal administrative Court 
considered that, the legislative provisions ruling ritual slaughter achieves an 
appropriate balance between freedom of religion and the constitutional aim 
of animal protection8. 
A second solution seems less absolute: it is the solution adopted by the 
US Supreme Court. The Court was confronted with the matter from the 
ritual sacrifice perspective (it seems that, the issue of ritual slaughter has not 
generated decisions in constitutional litigation, probably because it is 
allowed by the law9). The precedent or the most important decision, named 
“Lukumi”, was given in 199310. Several ordinances from the city of Hialeah 
                                                 
6 VfGH 17/12/1998, B 3028/97; Available at www.icl-journal.com Vol 3 3/2009, 229, 231. M. Vašek, 
Available at 
http://staatsrecht.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_staatsrecht/inst_staatsrecht_thienel/Vasek__
Ritual_Slaughter.pdf. Here, an administrative authority convicted the applicant under the animal 
protection Act for having known and tolerated the ritual slaughter of 26 sheep on his farm. In the light 
of the Constitution, the law was interpreted as allowing ritual slaughter. As a result, the conviction 
delivered against the farmer was annulled by the constitutional Court. 
7 BVerfG, 1783/99, January 15, 2002. 
8 BVerwG 3 C 30/05, November 23, 2006. 
9 See the Humane slaughter Act (P.L. 85-765; 7 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). 
10 USSC, June 11, 1993, Church of Lukumi Bbalu Aye, Inc. vs. City of Hileah, 508 U 520. 
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were at stake. Those ordinances were adopted immediately after the setting 
up of a Santeria place of worship in the city (and they were clearly targeting 
the practice of ritual slaughter by its members)11. In a decision mainly based 
on facts, the Supreme Court considered that, these ordinances were not 
neutral toward religion and that they targeted the Santeria Church. 
The Court notes that, other practices inflicting pain to animals are not 
counteracted by local authorities, for example hunting with animals alive. It 
also underlines that, the considerations based on sanitary protection are not 
pertinent because “The city does not (…) prohibit hunters from bringing 
their kill to their houses” (544). As a result, the contested decisions were 
enacted not to protect animals but to counter a religion. The city prohibited a 
practice just because it was inspired by religious considerations. Therefore, 
the Court concluded that, there had been a violation of the freedom of 
religion12. In this decision, the Court did not recognize a constitutional right 
to kill animals in accordance with a religious rite. It only censored 
discriminatory ordinances toward a religion13. 
The third solution, which makes less concession to religion, 
corresponds to the European Court of Human Rights case law. It results 
from a decision of 2000, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek against France14. The 
request had been made by a minority Jewish group (ultra-orthodox) who 
considered that, the majority group, having obtained from the authorities the 
agreement to practice ritual slaughter, were not slaughtering in a sufficiently 
traditional manner. The court rejected its request. It considered that, the 
European Convention on Human Rights does not recognize an individual 
right to practice ritual slaughter15. The Court of Strasbourg only recognizes 
a right to consume meat from animals slaughtered in accordance with a 
ritual proceeding. Since a believer may get such a meat, even by importing 
it, there is no interference with his freedom of religion. According to the 
                                                 
11 Santeria (aslo know as Lukumi) is a syncretic religion of West African and Caribbean origin 
influenced by and syncretized with Roman Catholicism. This cult is essentially practiced in Cuba, 
Colombia and Venezuela. 
12 If the city’s motivations had been other (i.e., if the city had been engaged in a sincere attempt of 
animal protection, in which the prohibition of ritual slaughter would have been only one aspect), then 
maybe those decisions would have passed the test of constitutionality. 
13 A legislation or an administrative act that would target a religious practice as a laic one could thus 
be conform to the Constitution. See S. L. Doheny, Free Exercise Does Not Protect Animal Sacrifice. 
The Misconception of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah and Constitutional Solutions 
for Stopping Animal Sacrifice, JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW 121 (2006). Available at 
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arus2journalanimallaw121.htm#_ftnref156. 
14 ECHR, June 27, 2000, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, n° 27417/95. 
15 ECHR, June 27, 2000, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, n° 27417/95, § 82: “the Court takes 
the view that the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention cannot extend 
to the right to take part in person in the performance of ritual slaughter (…)”. 
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Court, “there would be interference with the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion only if the illegality of performing ritual slaughter made it 
impossible for (belivers) to eat meat from animals slaughtered in accordance 
with the religious prescriptions they considered applicable”16 . Thus the 
choice whether to forbid or not ritual slaughter seems to fall into the 
domestic margin of appreciation of each member State. 
In any case, the general trend of the case law shows a strong protection 
of ritual slaughter and ritual sacrifice. A legislation or a regulation may be 
overruled if it prohibits the practice of ritual slaughter (Austria, Germany), 
if the prohibition targeted specifically a religious practice (USA) or if it 
prohibits the consumption of meat from animals slaughtered in accordance 
with a ritual proceeding (ECHR). 
C. Hunting with Hounds 
The question of a conflict, at the individual level, between tradition and 
protection, also appears in another area, namely hunting with hounds (which 
consists in chasing a wild animal with a pack of dogs till it is exhausted, and 
then encircling the animal; at that point, it is left do dogs or killed with a 
dagger or a spear). There again, a tradition is at stake17, and a tradition 
which provokes suffering for the hunted animal. It endures an important 
amount of stress throughout the chase and also the way is killed is painful 
(whether the animal is left to the dogs or killed with a blade). 
This is why, in the early 2000’s, Great Britain banned hunting with 
hounds18. 
The compatibility of this ban with the European Convention on Human 
Rights was contested by hunters who invoked a breach of their traditions. In 
their opinion, this constituted a violation of their right to privacy. The 
applicants submitted more precisely that hunting with hounds was part of 
their lifestyle and, was protected as such by Article 8 of the convention. 
                                                 
16 ECHR, June 27, 2000, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, n° 27417/95, § 80. This solution 
would condemn a prohibition to sell a meat coming from ritual slaughter. Such a proposal was made 
in Switzerland at the early 2000’s. A popular federal initiative was launched in 2002 “against ritual 
slaughter of animals without prior stunning” (March 12, 2002, FF 2002 2454). It aimed to prohibit the 
bleeding of animals without prior stunning, but also to forbid the import, commercialization and 
consumption of meat from animals that would not have been stunned. This initiative has not obtained 
the required number of signatures (October 26, 2003, FF 2003 5947). 
17 An old tradition. Painting from the 15th century represents scenes of hunting with hounds (see The 
Hunt in the Forest, Paolo Uccello, 1460’s). 
18 In Scotland, by the Protection of Wild Mammals Act adopted on February 13, 2002 and entered 
into force on August 1, 2002. In Britain and in Wales by the Hunting Act of 2004, applicable since 
February 18, 2005. 
2015      THE LIMITATION OF ANIMAL PROTECTION     7 
 
What was the answer of the Strasbourg’s Court19? It said: “The Court 
accepts (…) that, the hunting of wild mammals with hounds had a long 
history in the United Kingdom; that hunting had developed its own 
traditions, rituals and culture; and, consequently, that it had become part of 
the fabric and heritage of those rural communities where it was practised”. 
“for the individual applicants in the present cases, the Court accepts (…) 
that hunting formed a core part of their lives. It accepts therefore that, for 
various reasons, hunting came to assume a particular importance in the lives 
of these applicants”. However, “the Court is unable to regard the hunting 
community as an ethnic minority (…). The inter-personal ties which are 
then created cannot be taken to be sufficiently strong as to create a discrete 
minority group. Finally, (…) the Court does not consider that, hunting 
amounts to a particular lifestyle which is so inextricably linked to the 
identity of those who practise it that to impose a ban on hunting would be to 
jeopardise the very essence of their identity”. 
It results from the two areas mentioned above (ritual slaughter and 
hunting with hounds) that, in the current state of the law, legislation 
protecting animals can be overruled in the name of tradition only if the 
fundamental rights contained in it are closely linked to the individual (ie are 
part of his religious identity or his personal identity). If so, the tradition of 
abuse can prevail over the legislation of protection. 
Let’s consider now the opposite hypothesis: when a public authority 
(legislative or administrative), concerned by tradition, decides that it should 
prevail over protection. 
II. SECOND DIMENSION: THE LAW AUTHORIZES ANIMAL ABUSE ON THE 
BASIS OF A TRADITION 
In the name of tradition, this authority admits restrictions to animal 
protection or animal welfare. On this point, we may observe that, the Treaty 
on the Functionning to the European Union specially provides a possibility to 
derogate to animal protection in the name of tradition20. When such decision 
has been made, in the name of tradition, is it possible to challenge its legality 
(here again, by invoking superior norms)? The answer is different depending 
on whether or not a superior norm of animal protection exists. 
                                                 
19 ECHR November 24, 2009, Friend and others v. The United Kingdom, n° 16072/06. 
20 Article 13 TFUE: “In formulating and implementing, the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the 
Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of 
animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member 
States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage”. 
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A. First Situation: A Superior Norm Protecting Animals Exists 
When such a norm exists, we observe that, animal abuse justified by 
tradition does not resist jurisdictional control. 
They are materially incompatible with the norm of animal protection 
and, thus, the judge declares them invalid with no regard for the tradition 
that justified their enactment. All the examples that the author found come 
along these lines, whether the norm of protection is legislative, 
constitutional or international. 
The first example, regarding opposition to a legislative norm, bring us 
to Israel. It is related to the question of foie gras, more exactly the force-
feeding of geese and ducks to product foie gras. The question was submitted 
to the Israeli Supreme Court in 2001 by Noah, The Israeli Federation of 
Animal Protection Organizations. It was judged in 200321. The Supreme 
Court had to determine whether force-feeding (traditional method) was 
contrary to the Animal Protection Act, which prohibits torture, cruelty and 
abuse to animals. 
The issue at stake is the proportionality of the offence. Judges all agree 
that, force-feeding is torture, cruelty or abuse. But they had to determine 
whether the means were proportionate to the ends. This is where, in an 
underlying way, tradition interferes. Foie gras is presented as a luxury 
product. And this element is decisive to exclude the proportionality of the 
offence. To put it simply: force-feeding generates a lot of suffering for little 
pleasure. As a consequence, judges decided that, traditional force-feeding 
constitutes a violation of the Animal Protection Act. The regulation 
allowing force-feeding is thus declared void by the Supreme Court. 
The second example relates to a contrariety with an international treaty. 
The norm of protection is the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (1946). This convention established an International Whaling 
Commission having the power to regulate whale hunting. In 1986, the 
Commission issued a moratorium banning whale hunting. 
However, Japan keeps killing whales, invoking culture and tradition. 
This practice led Australia to file a lawsuit in the International Court of 
Justice. The Court handed down its judgement on March 31, 201422. 
As in the previous case, the conflict does not legally oppose tradition to 
protection. Indeed, since tradition does not constitute a ground admitted by 
the Convention to derogate to the ban on whale hunting, Japan put forward 
                                                 
21 Israeli Supreme Court, August 13, 2003, Noah vs. The Attorney General, HCJ n° 9232/01, IsrLR 
512. 
22 ICJ, March 31, 2014, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan). 
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another argument, constituting the only ground legally admitted, namely the 
pursuit of scientific research23. 
The International Court of Justice examined very carefully the 
arguments given by Japan in order to protect its programme of research on 
whales (called JARPA II24). And, over dozens of pages, the Court refuted 
every element put forward by Japan, showing the incoherence of the 
programme: no limits of time are fixed; it is based exclusively on lethal 
method (ie, allegedly to learn about whales, they are killed when they 
should be observed in their natural environment); no real scientific 
production has come out so far; at last the programme does not cooperate 
with other national and international scientific programmes. 
Consequently, the Court considers that, taken as a whole, JARPA II 
involves activities that can broadly be characterized as scientific research, 
but that “the evidence does not establish that the programme’s design and 
implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives”. 
The Court concludes that, the special permits granted by Japan for the 
killing, taking and treating of whales in connection with JARPA II are not 
“for purposes of scientific research” pursuant. 
Under the cover of scientific research, Japan actually pursues a 
commercial goal. Whale hunting, perpetrated exclusively in the name of 
tradition, is consequently prohibited, said the Court. 
The third example refers to a violation of a norm of protection of 
constitutional rank. It brings us to Brazil. A very interesting decision was 
granted on this point on the basis of Article 225 of the Constitution, which 
prohibits cruelty to animals. This decision is doubly interesting for our 
subject. First, as the previous cases mentioned, it concerns a practice 
justified by tradition. Secondly (and it distinguishes this decision from the 
previous ones), it puts at stake legally, a conflict between two norms of 
equal value: a constitutional norm of protection on the one hand, and a 
                                                 
23 Article VIII § 1: “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting 
Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take 
and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and 
subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and 
treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation 
of this Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such 
authorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time revoke any such 
special permit which it has granted”. A second ground is also admitted by the International Whaling 
Commission regarding the “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling”. This derogation is not justified by the 
defence of culture, in anyway not principally by it. As the name suggests, it aims above all to permit 
the survival of some populations (located in Greenland, Siberia and Alaska) by allowing them to kill 
whales to cover their nutritional needs in an inhospitable environment. 
24 Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic. 
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constitutional norm of tradition on the other hand. 
This decision, granted in 1997, concerns “farra do boi”, that we can 
translate as “Festival of the ox”25. It’s a feast (we should rather say an 
“event”) which takes place in the state of Santa Catarina, in the south of 
Brazil. Animals are literally tortured, then killed, by villagers26. 
In 1997, a claim was registered against the state of Santa Catarina. The 
Federal Supreme Tribunal had to arbitrate between protection and tradition: 
between Article 225 of the Constitution, which prohibits acts of cruelty, and 
Article 215, which protects the expression of cultural rights27. The Tribunal 
declared that, the state’s obligation to guarantee the full exercise of cultural 
rights, by encouraging the promotion and the diffusion of traditional events, 
does not exempt the state from also respecting Article 225 of the federal 
Constitution. As a result, the tribunal judged farra do boi as unconstitutional. 
Similarly, a legislation of the state of Rio de Janeiro, which authorized 
cockfighting, was quashed in 2011 for violation of Article 225 of the 
Constitution28. The federal Tribunal considered that, cockfighting does not 
represent a cultural event and, for this reason, is not protected by the 
constitutional provisions related to the protection of culture. 
In light of these examples, we see that, legislation or regulations 
allowing cruel treatment of an animal in the name of tradition does not resist 
a superior norm of animal protection (even in the hypothesis whereby 
culture and tradition have a constitutional guarantee)29. 
Invoking a superior norm of animal protection is a powerful argument 
against animal abuses established or justified (at a lower legal value) by 
tradition. 
What happens when such a norm does not exist? Is there a way of 
challenging a provision which, by derogating to a text on animal protection, 
admits cruel treatment to be imposed to an animal? 
                                                 
25 STF RE, June 3, 1997, n° 153.531-8, DJU October 13, 1998. 
26 For days before Farra do Boi starts, oxen are starved; food and water are placed just out of the 
animals’ reach. The days-long festival begins when drunken villagers release the oxen and chase, 
punch, kick, and attack the animals with sticks, knives, whips, stones, bamboo lances, ropes, and 
anything else they can get their hands on. The torture escalates as the festival drags on. Eyes are 
rubbed with hot pepper and then gouged out; limbs are broken and tails are snapped and hacked off; 
in a number of cases, gasoline is poured on these animals and people set them aflame. Some animals 
escape into the sea and drown. Any ox who survives the torment are eventually killed, their flesh 
divided among the participants. 
27 “The State shall protect the expressions of popular, Indian and Afro-Brazilian cultures, as well as 
those of other groups participating in the national civilization process”. 
28 STF, June 26, ADI 1.856 Rio de Janeiro. 
29 See also, in India: Supreme Court, May 7, 2014, Animal Welfare Board of India Vs. A. Nagaraja & 
Ors, n° 5388 of 2014 & ors. 
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B. Absence of Superior Norm: The Question of a Differentiation 
Here is the hypothesis: a legislative provision prohibiting in general 
animal cruelty exists, but, by derogation, allows some of them in the name 
of tradition. 
Can we criticize the very principle of a derogation justified by tradition? 
Is this ground of differentiation admissible? Or, in legal terms, is it 
compatible with the principle of equality? 
The French constitutional council decided, in 2012, that it is 
compatible with equality30. Its decision was about bullfighting, a practice 
prohibited by law as constituting an act of cruelty, but a practice also 
allowed by law in the localities where a tradition of bullfighting can be 
established. 
The roots of this exception are very old. During one entire century, in 
the name of tradition, the regions of bullfighting tradition have been 
rebelling against the law of 1850 prohibiting mistreatments on animals and 
refused to apply this legislation to bullfight. 
To take into account this tradition, a century later, in 1951, the 
legislator, yielding to this situation, introduced derogation. 
The constitutional council decided that, this legislative justification, 
based on tradition, was relevant to validate the exception provided for 
bullfighting. 
This solution shows that, without a superior norm of protection, it is 
difficult to challenge the choice of the legislator to favor tradition over 
protection. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, what comes out of this overview? What do superior 
principles of our legal orders, reveal of the relationship between tradition 
and protection in animal law? First, they reveal that, religious tradition 
benefits from an extremely high guarantee and is likely to call into question 
legislations prescribing prior stunning of animals. Secondly, they reveal that, 
beyond the question of ritual slaughter, the superior norms of protection 
tend to prevail on tradition, even when tradition has a legal value equivalent 
to the norm of protection, as is the case (for example) in Brazil. 
To close this study, it should be noted the unity or in any case the link 
between the two dimensions of the topic (the tradition of animal abuse 
prohibited by law and the tradition of animal abuse accepted by law). To 
                                                 
30 CC, dec. n° 2012-271 QPC, September  21, 2012. 
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underline this link, the author has chosen a telling example. 
In May, 2013, a bill aiming at prohibiting the sale of foie gras was 
discussed before the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) (its production in Israel 
being forbidden since the 2003 decision previously mentioned). 
What is interesting, is the reaction provoked by this initiative outside 
Israel. The Israel newspapers reported that, in France, a high representative 
of the Jewish religion expressed concerns about the bill. It addressed a letter 
to the Israeli Minister of agriculture, asserting that, the Israeli law 
prohibiting the sale of foie gras could jeopardize the practice of ritual 
slaughter in Europe. Actually, Israel does establish, through a law, that a 
tradition (a culinary tradition) cannot justify animal abuses. According to 
him, this law could be used in Europe (by animal activists) to argue that, 
another tradition (a religious tradition) cannot justify animal abuses too. If 
tradition is no longer a justification in one case, how could it be in another 
case? 
Such a reaction reveals the link between both dimensions. Each new 
text favoring animal protection over traditions weakens the admissibility of 
tradition as a justification of the infringement upon animal rights. 
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A FEW CRITICAL REMARKS ON ART. 25/3/F OF THE 
ROME STATUTE 
Igor Vuletić∗ 
In this paper, the author discusses some possible future perspectives of 
Art. 25/3/f of the Rome Statute. This article regulates two core institutes of 
traditional substantial criminal law—an attempt and a voluntary 
abandonment of an attempt. This is considered to be a huge step in 
codification of general part of international criminal law since statutes of 
ad hoc tribunal did not have any such or similar provisions. Other authors 
in criminal law literature have already argued a lot about the interpretation 
of specific elements of this provision. Bearing that in mind, in this research, 
the author discusses the purpose or ratio legis of an attempt and 
abandonment of an attempt in the Rome Statute. At the same time, the focus 
is on the quest for changes and modifications of this provision de lege 
ferenda. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Article 25/3/f of the Rome Statute regulates two of the core-
institutes of substantive criminal law: attempt and voluntary abandonment 
of an attempt. The Statutes of ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and 
Ruanda do not contain any such or similar provisions. Only indirectly, some 
of the provisions regulating the crime of genocide contain several modalities 
of conduct and some of these modalities could be considered as criminal 
attempt or even as preparatory acts.1 
The Rome Statute, however, for the first time in the history of 
international criminal law regulates these institutes in a separate provision, 
similar to the majority of the criminal codes in the countries of Continental 
Europe. 
                                                 
∗ Igor Vuletić, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the Faculty of Law Osijek, Croatia. 
Research fields: Substantive Criminal Law, International Criminal Law. 
1 See Art. 4 p. 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute and Art. 2 (d) of the ICTR Statute. 
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The structure of Art. 25/3/f has already been a subject of many 
scholarly debates. Several authors have given their comments on the 
essential elements of an attempt.2 The focus of these discussions was mainly 
on the distinction between preparatory acts and an attempt, and the 
beginning of an attempt. Voluntary abandonment of an attempt, on the other 
hand, has been considerably neglected by the authors. Bearing this in mind, 
in this paper, we will try to contribute to these discussions by introducing a 
novelty, not only about an attempt but also about voluntary abandonment of 
an attempt. 
The structure of the paper is the following: The first paragraph includes 
our remarks on legislative concept of criminal attempt in the Rome Statute. 
In the second paragraph, we deal with the problem of voluntary 
abandonment from criminal attempt in the Rome Statute. Finally, we will 
give our own suggestion of a possible model of future change of Art. 25/3/f. 
Our paper addresses primarily the creators of the Rome Statute. 
Nevertheless, we believe that, some of the given remarks could be useful to 
the judges of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC) as 
interpretative guidelines of Art. 25/3/f of the Rome Statute. 
I. REMARKS ON THE ATTEMPT: MOVING TOWARDS A MORE COMBINED 
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH? 
As already pointed out in the introduction, international criminal law in 
the period before the Rome Statute, did not regulate criminal attempt in a 
separate provision. However, in literature, there was a consensus that the 
law of attempts was a part of customary international criminal law and that, 
as such, it represented one of general principles of international criminal 
law. 3  Although the ICTY prosecutors showed certain unwillingness to 
prosecute attempts to commit international crimes, there were many 
criminal procedures after the World War II which proved that, attempt is the 
part of international customary law.4 In that sense, Art. 25/3/f did not bring 
any revolutionary change into international criminal law. Instead, it only 
codified what was already recognized before in practice of ad hoc tribunals. 
                                                 
2 For detailed analysis of Art. 25/3/f see f. e. KAI AMBOS, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES 
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2002), § 20. 
3 See GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 626 (2th ed., T.M.C. Asser 
Press 2009). 
4 For details see ROBERT CRYER, HÅKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON, & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 383 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2010); see also HELMUT SATZGER, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 
244-245 (Baden-Baden: C. H. Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2012). 
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Prior to the regulation of a certain institute of criminal law, every 
legislator must define the purpose or ratio legis of such institute. This is 
very important because only a clear definition of ratio legis can set 
guidelines for interpretation of the concrete provision. This means that, the 
definition of ratio legis has not only theoretical, but also practical 
significance. The question of ratio legis is basically a question of why 
something needs to be regulated. 
Now, we will put this question within the context of Art. 25/3/f of the 
Rome Statute. In the official explanation given by the International Law 
Commission (hereinafter: ILC), the attempt in the Statute is punishable due 
to two main reasons. First, it is considered that, there is “a high degree of 
culpability” attached to a perpetrator who attempted to commit a crime (the 
so-called subjective approach). Second, “the fact that an individual has taken 
a significant step towards the completion … entails a threat to international 
peace and security because of the very serious nature of these crimes” (the 
so-called objective approach). This suggests that, ILC was guided by 
subjective-objective approach, bearing in mind the specific nature and 
seriousness of these crimes and the need for prevention at the earliest 
possible stage. 5  But is this really the case? This brings us to our first 
working hypothesis and that is to find out which approach is truly accepted 
in attempt provision in the Rome Statute. 
In the theory of criminal law, there are three possible approaches 
towards interpretation of ratio legis of criminal attempt: subjective, 
objective and subjective-objective. These approaches have been discussed in 
details in comparative literature. In this paper, we will give only a brief 
overview of these approaches. 
The subjective approach emphasises the mental element of the attempt. 
To justify punishment for the attempt, subjective approach points out that, 
the perpetrator who attempted to commit the crime has the same mens rea 
(in Continental legal terminology that would be intent or dolus) as the one 
who actually managed to complete the crime. Whoever shot and missed 
obviously had the same intent to kill the victim as the one who shot and 
killed. Consequently, the attempt should be punished same as completed 
crime. Besides, the so-called impossible attempts (Ger. der untaugliche 
Versuch), such as shooting with an empty gun or at an already dead body 
without knowledge thereof, should be punished same as every other attempt. 
                                                 
5 For details of the ILC’s opinion and comment see Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility 
(Art. 25 Rome Statute), Transnationales Strafrecht/Transnational Criminal Law, Gesammelte 
Beiträge/Collected Publications 463-464 (Albin Eser ed., Berlin: BWV—Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag 2011). 
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The opposite approach is objective approach. It sees the essence of the 
attempt in objective element or actus reus. The attempt is punishable because 
the object (the victim) was endangered. However, one must admit that, such 
endangerment is significantly less than if the crime was completed. 
Consequently, in case of inchoate crimes, the court should always mitigate the 
sentence and the impossible attempt should not be punishable at all. 
Finally, the third approach combines the two opposites and sees the 
purpose of the attempt in criminal will or mens rea that was carried out by 
endangerment of the object. Accordingly, this approach also favours 
mitigation of sentence (objective approach) but only as an option for the 
judge, not as a mandatory obligation (subjective approach). Besides, this 
approach recognizes the effect of impossible attempt (objective approach) 
but it also leaves it to the court to decide whether it will draw any privileges 
to the perpetrator of the impossible attempt (subjective approach). This 
approach is considered to be the modern one in criminal law.6 Further in this 
paper, we will adopt this approach and our suggestions de lege ferenda will 
be modelled on it. 
Despite an official explanation given by the ILC mentioned above, we 
can object that, the text of Art. 25/3/f is founded on subjective-objective 
theory. That is easy to notice if one considers that, the Rome Statute does 
not predict the possibility of mitigation of a sentence, at least not expressis 
verbis. Moreover, it does not even regulate the institute of impossible 
attempt. These two features are two main requirements of the objective part 
of mixed subjective-objective approach. Consequently, we can give an 
answer to our first working hypothesis: Art. 25/3/f favours only the 
subjective approach, which is today considered to be obsolete and 
inadequate.7 
It seems that, the subjective approach is also favoured in the 
jurisprudence of the ICC. In its Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges 
in Katanga case, Pre-Trial chamber I emphasizes the subjective element of 
the attempt by pointing to the following: 
“The majority of the Chamber endorses the doctrine that, the attempt to 
commit a crime is a crime in which the objective elements are incomplete while 
the subjective elements are complete. Therefore, the dolus that embodies the 
attempt is the same as the one that embodies the consummated act.”8 
                                                 
6 For more about all three approaches see f. e. Claus Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Band II, 
Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat, 9-58 (München: Verlag C. H. Beck 2003), § 29. 
7 See supra note 3, 32-45. 
8 Katanga, et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, September 30, 
2008, paras. 458-460. 
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After analyses of ratio legis of the attempt in the Rome Statute, we are 
able to give our own remarks on how to improve this provision de lege 
ferenda. In our opinion, instead of favouring the subjective approach, the 
Rome Statute should consequently follow the idea given by the ILC and 
accept the mixed approach. This would certainly harmonize Art. 25/3/f in 
accordance with modern criminal codes in most countries of Continental 
Europe. This could be accomplished by introducing the expressis verbis 
possibility of mitigation of the sentence for the attempt as well as 
introducing the provision of impossible attempt. The possibility of 
mitigation of punishment is necessary if one wants to distinguish attempted 
from completed act. A contrario if there is no privilege for the attempt, it is 
not possible to estimate the gravity of these two stages of criminal offence. 
That is the main purpose of attempt provision in the general part. 
Impossible attempt is a very important institute in criminal law 
recognized not only in Continental Europe, but also in Anglo-American law. 
Fletcher explains this legal figure on the example of the perpetrator who 
thinks that, a stump is the man he wants to kill and shoots at it or a 
perpetrator who puts sugar in his victim’s coffee and he mistakenly believes 
that, the sugar is poison.9 In international crimes, impossible attempt would 
be possible in a case where for example a soldier would shoot a civilian who 
was already dead at the time of shooting. 
Impossible attempt is important if one wants to implement a mixed, 
subjective-objective legislative model. As we have already explained, in 
cases of impossible attempt there is sufficient mens rea, but insufficient 
actus reus. If these two elements have the same gravity, the legislator has no 
other option but to make the principle distinction between possible and 
impossible attempt. There are two possible solutions: To regulate this 
situation as a ground for excluding criminal liability or only as a ground for 
mitigation or acquittal from punishment. Other solution is accepted in every 
modern European criminal code today. Of course, these legal effects are 
possible only if the perpetrator has acted by a huge lack of understanding 
that he cannot complete the act. 
II. REMARKS ON THE ABANDONMENT OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT: BROADENING 
THE SCOPE OF ABANDONMENT? 
Voluntary abandonment from criminal attempt represents one of the 
core-institutes of general part of substantive criminal law. Article 25/3/f 
                                                 
9 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 146 (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2000). 
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regulates this institute for the first time in the history of international 
criminal law.10 It regulates a situation in which the perpetrator completely 
voluntarily and without any force gives up his conduct in the attempt phase, 
although he is well aware that, there are no objective factors which could 
stop him from completing the act. His motives for such acting can be 
different: Remorse or pity, lack of interest, fear of consequences if he gets 
discovered later etc. The motive is not important and what is important is 
that, the perpetrator acts voluntarily and that his actions are not motivated 
by any obstacles which could prevent him from completing the act. 
Probably the best theory that enables the court to estimate when the 
abandonment is voluntary is the one developed by Roxin, who suggests the 
adoption of the «average perpetrator’s logic» criterion. In that sense, the 
abandonment is voluntary only if it is not logical from the perspective of an 
«average» perpetrator. For example, it is not logical that, the rapist abandons 
the attempted rape only due to remorse towards the victim if he knows that, 
he cannot be discovered in any way because there are no witnesses and the 
victim has not recognised him.11 
Situations of voluntary abandonment from criminal attempt are quite 
rare because it is not often that, a perpetrator who acts with intent suddenly 
and without any objective reason changes his mind and even takes an effort 
to prevent the consequences of attempted criminal offence. Considering that, 
it is no wonder that, there has not been a single case of voluntary 
abandonment before the ICC. However, this institute is regulated in almost 
every Continental European criminal code and even some authors from 
England and Wales claim that, the defence of voluntary abandonment 
should be considered as part of the common law.12 In English literature, 
there are only a few decisions mentioning which courts, although they did 
not recognize abandonment as a defence, have mitigated the punishment in 
such cases.13 
                                                 
10 Abandonment provision was implemented as a result of proposal of Japanese delegation. See more 
in WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 439-440 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2010). 
11 Claus Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Band II, Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat, 
383-386 (München: Verlag C. H. Beck 2003), § 30. 
12 See R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 66-75 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996); see also A. P. 
Simester, J. R. Spencer, G. R. Sullivan, & C. J. Virgo, Siemester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, 
Theory and Doctrine, 342-343 (4th ed., Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing 2010). For opposite see 
f. e. J. C. SMITH, & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 299-300 (6th ed., London-Edinburgh: Butterworths 
1988); and WILLIAM WILSON, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE AND THEORY 543 (2th ed., Harlow: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2003). 
13 See Mathias Brockhaus, Die Strafrechtliche Dogmatik von Vorbereitung, Versuch und Rücktritt im 
europäischen Vergleich, Unter Einbeziehung der Aktuellen Entwicklungen zur ‘Europäisierung’ des 
Strafrechts, 386-387 (Hamburg: Verlag dr. Kovač 2006). 
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A comparative overview shows that, different systems give voluntary 
abandonment more or less gravity. There are systems such as for example 
the German, Austrian, Swiss, French, Spanish or Russian systems, which 
regulate voluntary abandonment from criminal attempt as grounds for 
excluding criminal liability. On the other hand, some legislators have 
decided to leave criminal liability untouched and to solve the problem in the 
sphere of sentencing. Such systems usually predict a possibility of 
mitigating the punishment or, in some cases, releasing from punishment, but 
criminal liability remains. The examples of such systems in Europe exist in 
the Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Macedonian and Hungarian criminal codes. 
However, these systems are in minority and they are often characterised by 
the lack of systematic theoretical debate about voluntary abandonment in 
their criminal law literature.14 
The leading theory about ratio legis of abandonment privilege in modern 
literature is the so-called «theory of the purpose of punishing» (Germ. 
Strafzwecktheorie), developed by Claus Roxin. This theory has the greatest 
number of followers in modern literature. The basic idea of this theory is that, 
in case of the perpetrator who has voluntarily abandoned his efforts to finish 
the attempt, there is no point to insist on conviction and punishment. Namely, 
criminal law conviction and punishment are based on the need for general and 
special prevention. That is the main justification of punishment and also of 
the criminal law system. If that justification fails, there is no ground for 
further criminal liability and any conviction or punishment will not be 
legitimate. Although this concept gives a relatively good explanation of the 
privilege, it is important to notice that, it is based on Roxin’s specific concept 
of criminal conduct, according to which one of the constitutive elements of 
criminal conduct is the so-called «necessity of preventive acting».15 
The creators of the Rome Statute obviously considered voluntary 
abandonment as an important legal institute since they regulated it as one of 
the grounds for exclusion of criminal liability. As already mentioned above, 
there are systems that regulate abandonment only in sentencing area, as a 
ground for mitigation or release from punishment. Legal regulation of 
                                                 
14 On comparative overview of voluntary abandonment in European legal systems see ibid. Details 
about the Serbian system can be found in Igor Vuletić, Legal Regulation of Voluntary Abandonment 
from Criminal Attempt—German Solutions and Serbian Potentials, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 
349-372 (Mirko Vasiljević & Vladimir Čolović eds., Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law 2011). 
15 See Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Band II, Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat, 7 (München: 
Verlag C. H. Beck 2003), § 30. This theory is accepted, not only by the majority of German authors, 
but also by authors outside Germany. See f. e. KeiichiYamanaka, Betrachtungen über den 
Strafbefreiungsgrund des Rücktritts vom Versuch in Bernd Schünemann/Claus Roxin, Festschrift für 
Claus Roxin zum 70. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2001 787 (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter 2001). 
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voluntary abandonment can be based on two main types of legislative 
approaches. 
The first approach—we will name it subjective—emphasises the 
subjective component: voluntariness. The main characteristic of such a 
system is legal possibility of the so-called non-causal abandonment (see 
below). The second approach—we will name it combined or subjective-
objective—gives equal value and gravity to both, subjective (voluntariness) 
and objective (abandoning the effort to complete the crime and/or 
preventing the consequence) components. These systems do not recognize 
the possibility of non-causal abandonment. Now, we can draw up the second 
working hypothesis in this paper: To define which type of legislative 
approach is implemented in the Rome Statute. 
The creators of the Rome Statute have chosen quite an unusual model 
of “double” regulation of voluntary abandonment of criminal attempt. The 
first part of this regulation is in the second part of the first sentence of Art. 
25/3/f.16 This is the so-called implicit or negative regulation of voluntary 
abandonment. Implicit definition has its role model in Art. 121-5 of the 
French Code Pénal. The second part of the regulation is the so-called 
explicit or positive model, which is contained in the second sentence of Art. 
25/3/f.17 This provision was introduced at the insistence of Japan, Argentina 
and Germany, who claimed that, voluntary abandonment is one of the 
traditional institutes of criminal law that exists in most of developed 
criminal law systems in the world. Explicit definition is primarily based on 
the modified Siracusa Draft of 1996 and § 5.01/4 of Model Penal Code 
(hereinafter: MPC).18 
This kind of double regulation of voluntary abandonment of criminal 
attempt is very atypical. Some authors claim that, it is an editorial error.19 
The comparative overview for European countries shows dominance of 
explicit or positive regulation,20 while negative regulation is accepted only 
                                                 
16 Art. 25/3/f:, first sentence: “Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances 
independent of the person’s intentions.” 
17 Art. 25/3/f, second sentence: “... a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise 
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the 
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.” 
18 Katrin Schubert, Der Versuch—Überlegungen zur Rechtsvergleichung und Harmonisierung, 243 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2005). 
19 Kai Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts, 755 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2002). 
20 Positive regulation is, for example, accepted in criminal codes of Germany, Switzerland, Spain, 
Austria, Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Denmark. See Matthias Brockhaus, Die Strafrechtliche Dogmatik 
von Vorbereitung, Versuch und Rücktritt im  Europäischen Vergleich, Unter Einbeziehung der 
Aktuellen Entwicklungen zur «Europäisierung» des Strefrechts, 139-275, 399-415 (Hamburg: Verlag 
Dr. Kovač 2006). 
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in the French, Belgian and Luxemburg law and it is considered to be 
outdated.21 Negative regulation assumes that, criminal attempt is constituted 
of one positive element—beginning of an attempt—and one negative 
element—missing of voluntary abandonment. 
We think that, negative regulation in the second part of the first 
sentence should be deleted. It is unnecessary and it only causes confusion, 
especially in terms of legal effect of voluntary abandonment on accomplices. 
Namely, the Rome Statute regulates voluntary abandonment as one of the 
grounds for excluding criminal liability («shall not be liable for 
punishment»). If one interprets voluntary abandonment as a negative 
element of an attempt, this means that, abandonment excludes the mere 
existence of attempted criminal offence. If that is the case, then the 
consequence is that, due to the accessoriness principle, not only the 
perpetrator who abandoned, but also the accomplices who did not abandon 
or did not even want to abandon, must also be excluded from criminal 
liability.22 This is a paradox and untenable solution. If A shoots at B and 
then changes his mind and calls an ambulance and saves his life, there is no 
reason to privilege C who was A’s aider or abettor (because he gave him a 
gun) and did not have anything to do with A’s abandonment. To avoid such 
interpretations, we suggest deleting the second part of the first sentence of 
Art. 25/3/f and keeping only the positive formulation from the second 
sentence. 
Furthermore, positive regulation from the Statute is only partially 
successful, because it neither regulates non-causal abandonment nor says 
anything about the abandonment of the accomplices. Non-causal 
abandonment is a situation where a person tries to abandon the effort to 
commit the crime but somebody else (or something else) prevents the 
consequence. For example, A shoots at B, leaves the place of crime but then 
changes his mind and returns to help B. When he arrives, he sees that, 
someone else has already called an ambulance and that B has been 
medically treated. In this case, the damage is prevented, only not by the 
perpetrator’s contribution but by someone else’s contribution. These cases 
are recognized as cases of voluntary abandonment in several European legal 
systems.23 Moreover, cases of non-causal abandonment are also mentioned 
in Anglo-American literature. In his book, Criminal Attempts Duff discusses 
                                                 
21 See supra note 8, 193-196, 198-199. 
22 Same Vlado Kambovski, Dobrovoljni Odustanak od Izvršenja Krivičnog Djela, 45 (Skoplje: 
Faculty of Law 1974). 
23 See for example § 24/1 of the German Criminal Code, § 16/2 of the Austrian Criminal Code, Art. 
23/3 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Art. 35/2 of the Croatian Criminal Code. 
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an example of “Mr. Grant” who puts the bomb into an airplane and sets the 
timer so that the bomb explodes in the air. Then he changes his mind and 
tries to disable the bomb but someone else had already done it or the bomb 
had exploded on the ground while the airplane was still empty. Duff points 
out that, these situations have to be taken into consideration by the court.24 
If we take the above mentioned elements of voluntary abandonment 
into consideration, we can answer our working hypothesis: Art. 25/3/f 
accepts a mixed approach. This is easy to conclude if one bears in mind that, 
the Statute does not regulate the possibility of non-causal abandonment. 
Moreover, we can notice that, the Statute allows abandonment in a very 
narrow scope because it does not regulate the possibility of abandonment for 
accomplices. 
We approve of the legislative approach, which favours non-causal 
abandonment because we believe that, the emphasis should be on a 
subjective component—voluntariness of the abandonment. Voluntariness 
demonstrates rejection of original criminal intent and justifies the privilege 
for the perpetrator. Only the perpetrator who voluntarily rejected his original 
intent (dolus) to commit the crime can be excluded from criminal liability. 
From the objective point of view, it is sufficient that consequence was 
prevented. Non-causal abandonment should, therefore, be a part of future 
abandonment provision in the Rome Statute. 
The abandonment of accomplices raises specific issues, which is why it 
should also be regulated in the Statute. All the above mentioned systems 
that accept the positive approach at the same time predict a provision 
regulating this question. The most common legislative solution is to predict 
that, the accomplice who wants to abandon, should prevent others from 
finishing the attempt. Such provisions can be found for example in the 
German, Austrian, Swiss, Croatian and Serbian criminal codes. The German 
law goes even further when it recognizes the possibility of non-causal 
abandonment of accomplices. That is the case in which, for example, A 
wants to abandon armed robbery, so he leaves the crime scene and calls the 
police but then finds out that somebody has already called the police and 
that the police has arrived and prevented the rest of the robbers from 
escaping (see § 24/2 of the German Criminal Code). In our opinion, the best 
solution is to add another sentence in Art. 25/3/f regulating abandonment of 
accomplices. We suggest to use the German provision as a role-model and 
to allow the possibility of non-causal abandonment of accomplices. This is 
consistent to our opinion that voluntary abandonment is characterised by its 
                                                 
24 R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 66-75 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996). 
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specific subjective nature—rejection of original criminal intent. 
III. DRAFT OF THE FUTURE ART. 25/3/F 
In order to give our own original contribution to this debate, we will 
offer our own draft of the future structure of Art. 25/3/f of the Rome Statute. 
We will then explain on each of the suggested changes. According to our 
idea, the future provision of Art. 25/3/f of the Rome Statute should be as 
follows: 
(1) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences 
its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur. 
An attempt may be punished more leniently than the completed act. If the 
perpetrator, due to huge lack of understanding, fails to recognize that, the 
attempt could not possibly lead to completion due to the nature of the object 
on which, or the means with which it was to be committed, the court may 
withhold punishment or in its own discretion mitigate the punishment; 
(2) However, a person who voluntarily abandons the effort to commit 
the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime or puts an effort 
to prevent them and the crime does not occur for other reasons, shall not be 
liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime 
if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. An 
accomplice who voluntarily prevents others from completing the crime or 
puts an effort to prevent them, and the crime does not occur for other 
reasons, shall not be made liable. 
The suggested provision has two subparagraphs. We think they are 
necessary if one wants to clearly distinguish between these two institutes of 
criminal law. The attempt is defined in subparagraph (I) in the same way as 
before only without the abandonment as its negative element. The second 
sentence predicts the possibility of mitigation of punishment as a potential 
privilege to the perpetrator. The third sentence introduces the institute of 
impossible attempt into the Rome Statute due to a huge lack of 
understanding and it is identical to § 23/3 of the German Criminal Code 
(Germ. Strafgesetzbuch, hereinafter: StGB). Such structure of this article is 
consistent with subjective—objective approach as proclaimed by the ILC. 
Abandonment is regulated in subparagraph (II) and based mostly on § 
24 of StGB. The same as in StGB, the new provision predicts the possibility 
of non-causal voluntary abandonment for a single perpetrator as well as for 
the accomplices. It is emphasized that, the abandonment must be taken 
voluntarily. These changes express the acceptance of subjective approach 
towards the regulation of this core institute of criminal law. This solution 
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follows modern trends in criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have given a brief overview of Art. 25/3/f of the 
Rome Statute. This article regulates the institutes of attempt and voluntary 
abandonment of an attempt. The mere existence of such a provision 
represents a huge progress in international criminal law because earlier 
statutes of ad hoc tribunals did not contain any similar provisions. 
However, we think that, there is a lot of space for further progress of 
international criminal law in this area. We strongly believe that, the creators 
of the Statute did not use all potentials of these two institutes. 
As for regulation of criminal attempt, we think that, the ideas of 
modern subjective-objective approach have not been completely adopted in 
the Statute. It is still necessary to introduce possible mitigation of 
punishment and to regulate impossible attempt. We think that, a good 
legislative model for these changes can be found in § 23 of the German 
StGB. 
As for voluntary abandonment from criminal attempt, we think that, 
double (positive and negative) regulation is confusing and unnecessary. 
Negative regulation is outdated and it has been abandoned in most of 
developed European criminal law systems. Therefore we believe that, the 
Rome Statute should keep only positive regulation. Moreover, it should 
expand the scope of this institute by introducing the possibility of non-
causal abandonment and by regulating the abandonment of the accomplices. 
One must not forget that, voluntary abandonment represents positive and 
socially acceptable behaviour because it demonstrates rejection of criminal 
attempt. That is why the emphasis should be on the subjective component—
voluntariness of the abandonment. In this sense, we think that, the good 
legislative model for these changes can be found in § 24 of the German 
StGB. 
We advocate German legal solutions mostly because legal regulation of 
the attempt and voluntary abandonment has been a great challenge for 
German authors for the past fourty years. In German literature, there are 
many monographs, dissertations and numerous articles on almost every 
possible problem aspect of these two institutes. Some of the most famous 
names of the German criminal law theory have written a lot about this issue. 
The result thereof is that, German literature and jurisprudence can be used 
also for the interpretation of the Rome Statute in this field of criminal law. 
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State boundaries are endpoints to where sovereignty lies within a 
country. The authorities within it regulate the relations inside and the 
nature of its international positions. The highest authority, which does not 
recognize any other form of higher power is sovereignty. Considering that 
the law, especially the international, is an active matter open to 
interpretation, although the basic features of a country are clear, yet there 
are two types of states divided to a de jure- existing under law and de facto-
existing in reality, based on the matter whether and which of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The state as a subject of International law as a general notion is defined 
through its four basic characteristics:  
y Population; 
y Territory; 
y Government and; 
y Sovereignty. 
The entirety of all citizens living within a certain territory, separated 
from other territories, which are subordinate to the government and have an 
established relationship with the state through legal connection-citizenship 
is called population. 
The territory is an area separated from other areas by border, where a 
certain population lives and where a certain authority extends. 
State boundaries are endpoints up until the sovereignty of a state 
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extends. 
The authority within a country regulates the relations in the state and 
the nature of its international positions. 
The highest authority, which does not recognize any other form of 
higher power is sovereignty1. 
The characteristics of a modern state, the way it is recognized 
nowadays are shaped by Peace Treaty of Westphalia2, according to which 
the state is constituted by three main features, territory, population and 
sovereignty, i.e., absolute power for governining over them3. In order to 
have a better understanding of the process of recognition and various 
specifics that have occurred throughout history, the attention must be paid to 
the terms sovereignty and statehood first, and thereto sovereignty refers to 
how a state acquires it as well, and later on the manners through which 
countries recognize the existence of another state4. 
I. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Sovereignty denotes supreme and independent authority over certain 
territory and its population. This type of interpretation which is a part of a 
broader definition regarding the notion of state, plays a significant role in 
each aspect of the international relations and international law because it 
indicates that, no one else, referring to another state, has no right to impose 
and implement laws on the territory of a sovereign state. According to 
which, the law of using force aiming law enforcement depends solely on the 
governing organ, meaning the Government, the Presidents or a divided 
sovereignty between both institutions. Hence, if a state acquires sovereignty 
recognized by other states, they acknowledge its governing over a certain 
territory and population and withdraw the possibility to interfere the state 
internal matters they have recognized. 
Sovereignty is generally divided into:  
y Internal and; 
y External. 
Internal sovereignty is determined by the state organ with the authority 
                                                 
1 WILLIAMS, GOLDSTEIN, & SCHFRITZ, CLASSIC READINGS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 82 (Belmond, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company). 
2 PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. Available at http://www.britannica.com (last 
visited July, 2013). 
3 The Crisis of the Sovereign State and the “Privatization” of Defense and Foreign Affairs (Heritage 
Foundation). Available at http://www.heritage.org (last visited April, 2012). 
4 DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION (Wikipedia) Available at http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited July, 
2013). 
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for exercising the power, while external sovereignty depict the role of the 
state as a sole in the international community, and the attitude towards the 
state as to the bearer of rights and obligations in relation to other states in 
international law. 
Considering the significance of the term sovereignty, the importance 
and role of the decision whether a country will be internationally recognized 
or not is becoming clear, as well as the necessity of each territory and 
people aspiring to become state to provide the conditions for acquiring 
sovereignty. 
II. FIVE MANNERS TO ACQUIRE SOVEREIGNTY 
Sovereignty is generally acquired in five manners, out of which four 
are being recognized by the international law5. 
The first manner is through settling to “no man’s land” or land on 
which no one had previously claimed rights for sovereignty, or if it was 
under possession previously and this possessor has withdrew their sovereign 
rights over the country, thus removing the obstacles for a new or another 
country to realize its sovereignty over that territory. 
The second manner is connected with the first and anticipates attaining 
of sovereignty, through the same exercise for a longer period on the territory 
without another state disputing that right. 
Separation is the third manner through which the sovereignty can be 
attained, but it needs to be conducted in accordance with the state in which 
this separated territory has been part of. Thus the transfer of the rights from 
one to another sovereign is made in such way, most often through 
agreement, so the modern trends and arousing of the idea for self-
determination impose the new sovereign to gain the consent from the 
population whose territory requests sovereignty before acquiring it. Such 
case represents the uniting on Eastern and Western Germany which was 
occupied by four countries—USA, France, Great Britain and Soviet Union. 
All of them have given a consent for implementation of this process and 
withdrew the sovereign right over its part from the German territory for 
which the citizens has expressed themselves positively. 
The fourth one out of the mentioned five methods nowadays is not 
considered as a legal manner for attaining the sovereign, because it is based 
for acquiring what is announced as illegal by the United Nations, and as 
such is considered in its Charter that has been signed and ratified by each 
member state. 
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The fifth and the final type for setting the right for sovereignty over 
certain territory concerns if it is established as an additional part of already 
existing territory, through a manner of natural growth such as sedimentation 
or volcanic activities. 
III. TERMS “DE JURE” AND “DE FACTO” RECOGNITION OF STATES 
Considering the fact that, the law, especially the international law is an 
active matter open for interpretation even though the basic characteristics in 
one state are clear, yet there are two types of states divided into: de jure- 
existing according the law and de facto- existing in reality, based on the fact 
which of the statehood features they own6. 
De jure states are those that are fulfilling some of the conditions of 
statehood but not all three. As an example can be considered, a country that 
has a territory and a population but not full sovereignty over them. Also a 
good example could be a government in exile as well, or government under 
which the international community has the right to exercise sovereignty 
over a territory and a population but because of the occupation can not 
exercise that right, as is the case with the governments of the Baltic states in 
the period during World War II, while their territories were under Nazi 
occupation, they are recognized by the countries of the alliance as their 
legitimate rulers, role which de facto was taken over after the release. 
Another specific example of recognized sovereignty in the absence of 
territory in some way but not completely de jure state but rather as de jure 
government is the sovereignty dealing with “the organization” known as the 
Sovereign Military Order of Malta. 
This “organization” had an authority in Malta in the past, but after the 
expulsion of its members from the island, they continue to exist in Rome. 
Interestingly, the Order is recognized as sovereign by many countries, a 
situation that reflects the fact that, it has established diplomatic relations 
with 103 states and 6 entities that are subject to international law, including 
the European Union whereby they have responded with reciprocity that have 
established diplomatic relations with the Order. Apart from diplomatic 
relations, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta has few buildings in the 
city of Rome that, the Italian Government has granted their extraterritorial 
status which means that, within the territory/facilities, the law is 
implemented by the Order, and not by Italy, and this is a status reserved 
exclusively for the embassies of countries. In addition the United Nations 
does not register the Order of Malta as “a non-member”, but as an entity that 
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has received a valid invitation to participate as an observer in the 
organization. Apart from these typical state features “the organization” has 
its own army, which is part of the Italian Army, however flying the flag and 
under the command of the Order; it also has coins that have rather collectors 
than a symbolic role and uses postal stamps, although not everywhere yet 
accepted by a number of European and world countries. 
De facto state is considered the one that is an entity owning a territory 
and a population and sovereignty, but which lacks a legitimate recognition 
by a number of other states. This usually happens if a de facto state has been 
part of another country previously that opposes and denies its sovereignty. 
Here lies the tangent point between the characteristics of statehood and the 
need for their recognition as legitimate by other, already existing countries. 
There are many examples of de facto countries in the world including 
Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China considers it as part of its 
territory even though there is no real sovereignty over it, as is the case of 
Somaliland and Somalia, to some extent Kosovo and Serbia etc. 
IV. RECOGNITION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Institute “recognizing the states” is common and very important 
legal institution within the International Law initially, because of the 
political circumstances which are determining it7. Up until now, there is not 
precise rule accoriding to which one state becomes internationally 
recognized, and has the right of statehood and right to participate as single 
with the other states from different imternational organizations8. There are 
some attemts made in order to establish certain universal criteria for 
acquiring the aforementioned statuses and possibilities but none of them has 
succeded to be affirmed as a relevant and respected by all the states in the 
world. There are two theories that study this matter9. The first one is the 
Declarative Theory of statehood, originating from the conference held in 
Montevideo10, which is best put in the sentence “the political existence in 
one state is independent from its recognition by other states”. 
According to this theory for acquiring statehood, and thus the 
involvement of the state in international law as its subject, the following 
four element must be included: territory, population, sovereign power and 
                                                 
7 LJ. D. FRCKOSKI, V. TUPURKOVSKI, & V. ORTAKOVSKI, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 58 (Tabernakul, 
Skopje 1995). 
8 Additional information at: Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate 
and Evolution, (Praeger Publishers 1999). 
9 Additional information at: H. Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, YALE LAW 
JOURNAL (New Haven Conn. 1944). 
10 Additional information at: Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, (1933). 
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ability to manage the previous three. Going back to the beginning of this 
text, it can be seen that, the largest part of the definition is taken from the 
Treaty of Westphalia, which means that, it is not a novelty in international 
law, but an existing criteria which although recognized it is not fully 
accepted and implemented free from discrimination. 
International law includes Constitutive Theory of statehood. It 
examines the state recognition by other states as instrumental in acquiring 
statehood and status of a subject of international law to a new country. The 
aspects that are covering this theory, which although not formally accepted 
worldwide but can be considered as realistic are beautifully depicted in the 
thought of Openheim (L. Oppenheim) that says “International law says that, 
a state does not exist until it is recognized by other, but at the same time, it 
does not exist until it acquires recognition.” 
It can be concluded that, the acquisition of independence and 
international legal subjectivity of a state is formally dependent on its 
international recognition, which is based on the will of other countries. 
Sublimating the declarative positions of states as for this subject and 
reality of the foregoing, it can be concluded that, the recognition of a state as 
a sovereign entity and relevant international law is open to interpretation, 
there are no rules in this field and any existing state recognized a new state 
on its own discretion and in accordance with its national interests, while not 
obligatory adhering to certain customary norms in international behavior. 
V. THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RECOGNITION OF STATES 
After noting that, the recognition of states in international law is a 
matter of political decision, lets consider the methods by which it is awarded 
11. Seemingly with the classification of the de jure- states and de facto-states, 
both models exist as methods of recognition. De jure recognition means 
having a formal legal act—a diplomatic note, law or declaration, often in the 
legislature or by the government or head of state, which through an official 
document is published on a recognition by one state over another12. This 
method is ambiguous and is not free for interpretation. 
The second method, de facto implies the establishment of political, 
economic and other types of relations. 
The differences between the first and second lies in the formal legal 
document which results with rights and obligations, which in the first case is 
present, and but not in the second one. 
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12 4(1) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-71 (1993). 
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De facto recognition is often used in order to avoid disruption of 
bilateral relations with another state, but also to implement actual 
recognition of the state. The manners of relations between two states that 
can be seen as steps towards recognition are: the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, the visiting of head of state at the country which 
requires recognition, bilateral agreements between both countries and the 
recognition of the passports of this country that is recognized by the existing 
state. Seen throughout the history there are cases in which diplomatic 
communication between the two countries have been necessary, one of 
which is not recognized internationally, as is the case in the establishing of 
the dialogue between the United States and the Palestinian independence 
movement, which, to avoid sending an informal message for recognition, 
the existing state explicitly states that, its activities do not imply to 
recognition of the state which due to certain reasons temporarily establishes 
relations with that state. A similar example is the relationship of Taiwan by 
a number of countries. While officially recognized and has diplomatic 
relations with only 23 countries, unofficially in Taiwan there are research 
offices and cultural centers and trade associations covered by the United 
States, Australia, Britain, France and many other countries. 
According to the doctrine introduced in the thirties of the twentieth 
century by Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Genaro Estrada, except 
previous two methods of recognition of states introduces a third one. What’s 
the difference? If the policy of the state is to perform legal recognition, it 
means that, at any unconstitutional change of the goverment within the state, 
it must come up with a statement that expresses positive or negative attitude 
in terms of recognizing the new government13. 
The advantage of this policy is the possibility of revising the attitude 
towards other countries at any unconstitutional change, but it means 
interfering in its internal affairs through the approval or disapproval of the 
changes. The policy of tacit recognition is a balance between the other two 
doctrines and according to it, the state is not obliged to assess new 
government of another country, but if it is willing, may confirm or withdraw 
the recognition. The third doctrine, which is most frequently used nowadays, 
refers to recognizing states rather than governments. Thus if the first state 
has recognized the state where unconstitutional change of government 
occurred, they will not review the decision for recognition based solely on 
the change of the regime. The advantages of this policy are far lower 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures through the political changes 
that are taking place worldwide. However there are deficiencies which are 
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consisted of leaving room for maneuver, in case there is a real need to 
review cooperation with the country in which the change occurred. 
As a special form of recognition could be considered also the so-called 
“Collective recognition of states” that can occur through common 
acceptance of membership of a country in the regional and universal 
international organizations, through common acceptance of the declaration 
at the international conference or through a formal procedure in the bodies 
of the international organization. 
The recognition of a state internationally is depicted through its 
membership in the United Nations (UN)14. With the membership at this 
world organization, every dilema about the independence and sovereignty of 
any country is being eliminated. That is so because becoming a member of 
this international institution is necessary to achieve the recognition of the 
five member states of the Security Council, such as the US, Russia, China, 
Britain and France, and without their decision (resolution), it is not possible 
to achieve membership. 
But it is important to point out that, there is no requirement (in the UN 
Charter) which obliges Member States, upon the acceptance of a new state 
membership in the UN, to establish “full political and legal recognition” 
through the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations15. 
CONCLUSION 
The entirety of all citizens living within a certain territory, separated 
from other territories, which are subordinate to the government and have an 
established relationship with the state through legal connection-citizenship 
is called population. The territory is an area separated from other areas by 
border, where a certain population lives and where a certain authority 
extends. State boundaries are endpoints up until the sovereignty of a state 
extends. 
The authority within a country regulates the relations in the state and 
the nature of its international positions. The highest authority, which does 
not recognize any other form of higher power is sovereignty. 
The Institute “recognizing the states” is common and very important 
legal institution within the International Law initially, because of the 
political circumstances which are determining it. 
                                                 
14 Further information at: HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Available at 
http://www.un.org. 
15 LJ. D. FRCHKOSKI, V. TUPURKOVSKI, & V. ORTAKOVSKI, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 61 
(Tabernakul 1995). 
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Considering the fact that, the law, especially the international law is an 
active matter open for interpretation even though the basic characteristics in 
one state are clear, yet there are two types of states divided into: de jure- 
existing according the law and de facto- existing in reality, based on the fact 
which of the statehood features they own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds have become a hot topic of great media scrutiny, buoyed 
by the veil of secrecy that cloaks much of their actions. The primary concern 
amongst investors and speculators centered on being able to get their money 
in to hedge funds, lucrative high growth potential funds that have used 
leveraged maneuvers in recent years to yield tremendous returns. 1  This 
activity was made possible largely by cheap credit, which seemed for a 
period to be in endless supply. Highly secretive fund managers were able to 
use these market conditions to their advantage, leveraging their way into 
status as the current golden boys of Wall Street.2 However, with the rapid 
change of market sentiments, for the first time in years, the question on the 
minds of speculators and institutional investors alike is not how to get 
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money in to the hottest hedge funds, but how to get it out.3 
Because of their extreme leveraged positions, many hedge funds are 
susceptible to downturns, and even total collapse. This does not mean that, 
hedge funds are going away; it simply means that some will fail. Getting 
money out of these funds is of special legal consequence now, as the climate 
is shifting toward such a desire that has not been examined in much detail. 
This is compounded in the case of insolvency, which brings up questions 
related to the fraudulent conveyance statue, and at what point a hedge fund 
is considered insolvent under the fraudulent conveyance statute. 4  The 
market players who have their money in hedge funds range from the rogue 
speculator, to the mighty institutional investors such as large pension funds 
and university endowments. A year ago, the hedge fund machine seemed to 
be an unstoppable force, but now, the prospects of large Wall Street 
investment banks may hinge on the viability of their flagship hedge funds.5 
With buyouts now being renegotiated and debt lingering in the air on 
hanging deals, it is easy to decry the plight of the hedge fund. 6  It is 
impossible to say if the credit squeeze will continue, or if so, whether fund 
mangers will be able to devise new methods for turning quick return. 
Regardless of the path the market will take, it is now apparent that, hedge 
funds are not the invulnerable fortresses in which the rich can generate 
massive returns with relatively low risk. 
With risk spread throughout the market by quants and funds of funds, 
exacerbated by the copycat nature of the hedge fund business, many legal 
implications come to the foreground in terms of getting money out of these 
funds, and exposure to risk in cases of fund bankruptcy. Hedge funds will 
likely to continue to grow in power. Some funds will fail, but such is the 
nature of capital markets. This does not mean that, hedge funds will all be in 
trouble; on the contrary, hedge funds will continue to play an increasingly 
important part in the global economy. 
The high number of funds, coupled with the fact that, funds deal with 
extreme leverage, means that some funds will fail. The current credit crisis 
will not cripple the hedge fund by any means, but what it does is show that, 
funds acting in extreme leverage can be vulnerable to market conditions. For 
the sake of investors, who will continue to pour money into these funds, it is 
essential that, we examine the prospects of getting money out of these funds, 
                                                 
3 Jeff D. Opdyke, & Eleanor Laise, Investors Mull How to Get Out of Hedge Funds: Market Turmoil 
Highlights Notoriously Tricky Rules For Redeeming Shares, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 2007, 
at B1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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and what happens in insolvency cases. 
People now want to know how they can get out of these funds, whether 
they are still solvent or have become insolvent. Lawyers for wealthy 
investors and speculators will have to be prepared to address such questions 
from clients, who are understandably worried and want to avoid the 
proverbial run on the hedge fund bank.7 This paper will not address issues 
of hedge fund regulation, nor make arguments for registration and 
transparency standards to be implemented in much the same way mutual 
funds are regulated.8 Instead, this paper will examine the legal realities of 
redemption of funds, fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy implication 
for investors in hedge funds. 
I. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF HEDGE FUNDS 
Unlike mutual funds, which are highly regulated, hedge funds are not 
required to redeem investors’ assets within seven days from the date on 
which it receives a notice for redemption from an investor, and may take 
illiquid positions without limitation and may engage in leveraged 
transactions with greater freedom. 9  The legal structure of a hedge fund 
largely depends upon who its investors will be, though all investors in funds 
must be financial qualifications that certify them as having sufficient assets 
to bear the risk of investing in a hedge fund.10 
For the purpose of managing the assets of persons residing in the 
United States, a hedge fund is ordinarily organized as a limited 
partnership. 11  By purchasing an interest in the partnership, an investor 
becomes a limited partner of the partnership.12 Thus, the terms, including 
redemption of funds, will be contained in the partnership agreement. 13 
Depending on the laws of the state in which the general partner will 
maintain its office, the hedge fund manager will organize the general partner 
as a limited liability company, corporation or limited partnership. 14  In 
certain cases, however, the manager will form two entities, one entity to 
serve as the general partner and the other entity to serve as a management 
                                                 
7 See Supra note 3. 
8 For such arguments, see: Douglas L. Hammer et al, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2005). 
9 Id. 
10 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, SEC STAFF REPORT 78. Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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company.15 
For the purpose of managing the assets of persons residing outside of 
the United States, an offshore fund is ordinarily structured as a corporation 
and organized in a tax haven jurisdiction.16 The jurisdiction in which the 
fund is organized often depends on the countries in which investors reside 
and the type of entity the sponsor desires to form. 17  Also, certain 
jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, have a well-developed regulatory 
system for organizing and maintaining investment funds but are more 
expensive than other jurisdictions, such as the British Virgin Islands, which 
do not have as extensive a regulatory scheme.18 
Often, the manager of an offshore fund forms a corporate entity to 
provide advisory services to the fund.19 This entity serves as the investment 
manager of the fund.20 If the hedge fund manager already manages the 
assets of a domestic partnership through a single corporate entity, the 
general partner of the partnership may also serve as the investment manager 
of the offshore fund.21 If the sponsor is managing the assets of a partnership 
through two corporate entities, the entity serving as the management 
company of the domestic partnership will ordinarily serve as the investment 
manager to the fund.22 
II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM LTCM CASE 
In order to understand the current issue with hedge fund insolvency and 
redemption issues, it is essential to look at the first manifestations of similar 
events. The recent collapse of two large Bear Stearns funds is not the first 
time a high profile hedge fund has defaulted. The infamous demise of Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 set the precedent for actions in 
hedge fund insolvency, and serves as a framework for understanding the 
proceedings that will ensue in future hedge fund meltdowns.23 The LTCM 
episode raises some issues involving the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.24 The first 
                                                 
15 Douglas L. Hammer et al, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2005). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Alistair MacDonald, A Hedge Haven Makes Its Rules Even Lighter, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sep. 
29, 2007, at B1. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 Supra note 10. 
23 Statement on Long-Term Capital Management and the Report of the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS ROUNDTABLE, Oct. 6, 1999. See Franklin R. Edwards, 
Insolvency Law and Financial Stability in OTC Derivatives Markets, WORKING PAPER, March, 2003. 
24 Id. 
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involves clarifying the ability of certain counterparties to exercise their 
rights with respect to closeout, netting, and liquidation of underlying 
collateral in the event of the filing of a bankruptcy petition without regard to 
the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.25 
These provisions, which the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets urged Congress last year to expand and improve, are generally 
recognized to be important to market stability.26 They serve to reduce the 
likelihood that, the procedure for resolving a single insolvency will trigger 
other insolvencies due to the creditors’ inability to control their market 
risk.27 In other words, this protects the market from the systemic problem of 
“domino failures.”28 
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, a simultaneous rush by the 
counterparties of a defaulting market participant to replace their contracts 
could put pressure on market prices.29 To the extent that the default was due 
to fluctuations in market prices in these contracts, this pressure might tend 
to exacerbate those fluctuations, at least in the near term.30 This problem 
could be significant where the defaulting debtor had large positions relative 
to the size of the market. The possibility of a debtor defaulting during 
volatile markets where the debtor had large positions relative to the size of 
certain markets, was the specter created by the potential default of the 
LTCM Fund.31 
In the highly volatile markets of September, 1998, the failure of the 
LTCM Fund would have left a number of creditors with open market 
positions subject to extreme volatility. 32  Termination of those contracts 
would have required counterparties to replace contracts that, they held with 
the LTCM Fund in the relatively near term.33 However, had termination not 
been available to the LTCM Fund’s counterparties in the bankruptcy 
process, the uncertainty as to whether these contracts would be performed 
would have created great uncertainty and disruptions in these same markets, 
coupled with substantial uncontrollable market risk to the counterparties.34 
The inability to exercise closeout netting rights could well have resulted in 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Coy Peter, & Wooley Suzanne, Failed Wizards of Wall Street, BUSINESS WEEK, Sep. 21, 1998. 
32 Id. 
33 Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 13(2) 
THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 189-210 (Spring 1999). 
34 Id. 
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an even worse market situation if the LTCM Fund had filed for bankruptcy 
than the exercise of such rights in this situation.35 
Why was Federal Reserve intervention necessary? The intervention of 
the Federal Reserve to head-off the insolvency of LTCM raises a serious 
systemic concern that still exists and is not widely understood. Further, this 
systemic concern is not specific to hedge funds but arises out of the 
pervasive use of derivatives by financial market participants. The 
fundamental reason that the Federal Reserve intervened in the LTCM case is 
that, bankruptcy law in the United States (and in most other countries) does 
not treat derivatives counterparties as it does all other creditors. Specifically, 
current U.S. bankruptcy law exempts derivatives counterparties from the 
normal operation of the Bankruptcy Code, and in particular from the 
automatic stay provisions of the Code.36 
As a consequence, had LTCM been unable to meet its obligations and 
filed for protection under Chapter 11, its derivatives counterparties could 
still have, and certainly would have, immediately terminated their contracts 
with LTCM, resulting in the “... abrupt and disorderly closeout of LTCM’s 
positions which would [have] pose[d] unacceptable risks to the American 
economy.”37 Only the intervention of the Federal Reserve in arranging a 
creditor-bailout enabled LTCM to avoid a bankruptcy filing, which would 
have triggered the immediate liquidation of its positions.38 
In principle, the same result could have been achieved without the 
intervention of the Federal Reserve, had the Bankruptcy Code not exempted 
LTCM’s derivatives counterparties from the automatic stay provision of the 
Code.39 In that case, a bankruptcy filing by LTCM would have “stayed” 
LTCM’s derivatives counterparties, as well as its other creditors, and would 
have resulted in a court-supervised creditor-workout of LTCM’s positions.40 
As subsequent events have shown, it was clearly in the joint interests of 
LTCM’s creditors, to avoid a “fire sale” of LTCM’s positions and to 
facilitate a creditor “work-out” by putting in more capital and reorganizing 
the ownership structure of LTCM.41 Many economists argue that, had the 
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37 See Coy, supra note 19. 
38 See Edwards, supra note 21. 
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40 Statement on Long-Term Capital Management and the Report of the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS ROUNDTABLE, Oct. 6, 1999. See Franklin R. Edwards, 
Insolvency Law and Financial Stability in OTC Derivatives Markets, WORKING PAPER, March, 2003. 
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bankruptcy code allowed this, there would have been no need for the 
Federal Reserve to intervene.42 
Ironically, the potential destabilizing role that bankruptcy law played in 
the LTCM crisis was the result of series of changes in the Bankruptcy Code 
made by the U.S. Congress, in order to reduce the likelihood of systemic 
instability in off-exchange derivatives markets. 43  The rationale for 
exempting “derivatives securities” contracts from the automatic stay 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is that, this exemption is necessary to 
maintain the liquidity and stability of derivatives markets to prevent the 
“insolvency of one commodity or security firm spreading to other firms and 
possibly threatening the collapse of the affected market.” 44  Congress 
believed that: “The prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s position is generally 
desirable to minimize the potentially massive losses and chain reaction of 
insolvencies that could occur if the market were to move sharply in the 
wrong direction.”45 
In interpreting the scope of the exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code, the 
bankruptcy appellate panel for the Ninth Circuit cited the comments of 
Senator Dole, during the Senate discussion on the amendment to Section 
362 of the Bankruptcy Code: “It is essential that, stockbrokers and securities 
clearing agencies be protected from the issuance of a court or administrative 
agency order which would stay the prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s 
positions, because market fluctuations in the securities markets create an 
inordinate risk that, the insolvency of one party could trigger a chain 
reaction of insolvencies of the others who carry accounts for that party and 
undermine the integrity of those markets.”46 
In retrospect, it seems clear that, had LTCM’s derivatives 
counterparties not been exempted from the automatic stay provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, there would not have been either an “... abrupt and 
disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions ...” or an “... unwinding [of] 
LTCM’s portfolio in a forced liquidation ...,” and there would have been no 
need for the Federal Reserve to intervene to prevent a “... seizing up of 
markets ... that could have potentially impaired the economies of many 
nations, including our own.”47 
The major systemic risk issue raised by the near-collapse of LTCM is 
whether recent revisions to the bankruptcy law in the United States, and 
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other countries have created another source of financial instability in 
financial markets by enabling a counterparty run on the positions of a 
financially-stressed counterparty.48  As LTCM illustrated, a “counterparty 
run” has the potential to result in a systemic liquidity shortage, with 
uncertain and potentially damaging economic effects.49 It is notable that, 
some recent academic papers have argued that, a “fire sale” of financial 
assets can cause or exacerbate liquidity shortages, resulting in systemic 
illiquidity with the potential to cause runs and threats to overall capital 
markets.50 
III. HEDGE FUND REDEMPTION APPROACH AND EXIT STRATEGY 
If getting out of funds were simple, lawyers would not need to be 
intricately involved, nor would heavily invested individuals be so worried 
over the prospects of getting their money out. Hedge funds, however, have 
notoriously tricky rules regarding such exits, even though it would seem to 
be a simple matter of a clause in the partnership agreement.51 Exiting from a 
hedge fund can be far more complex than selling a stock or a mutual fund.52 
Redemption policies vary widely. Most funds will redeem your money only 
at the end of a calendar month, or the end of a quarter. And you generally 
must provide written notice in advance that you intend to redeem money. 
The notice period is often 30 days to 60 days, but some funds require as 
many as 90 days or more.53 Rules for redeeming money from a hedge fund 
are generally laid out in the limited-partnership agreement.54 
The long notice period means that, investors might not see their money 
for weeks, or even months, in which time markets might shift 
dramatically.55  Also, fleeing funds now won’t help avoid losses already 
booked. And troubled funds may freeze the ability of investors to redeem 
their money to keep from having to dump assets at falling prices, as Bear 
Stearns did recently with its Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. 
For investors trying to gauge their own situation, the key challenge is 
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knowing what your hedge fund owns.56 Hedge funds typically have just a 
limited number of investors, often no more than a few hundred, so your 
chances of talking to someone that matters are pretty good. 57  This is 
particularly true if you have a large amount of money invested, especially 
the case with large institutional investors who are sure to get a receptive ear 
from fund management. If a fund is being inundated with calls, it might set 
up a conference call aimed at explaining the current situation to all investors 
at once.58 Investors can also review quarterly “13F” filings, in which hedge-
fund managers with more than $100 million in certain public securities must 
disclose those holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission.59 But 
these filings may not be useful to look inside some of the quant funds that 
are now stumbling, because such funds can make thousands of trades a 
day.60 
If investors think that, there is a problem brewing or already present 
with their fund, they should make their redemption quickly to avoid a traffic 
jam.61 Overall, the industry comprises roughly 6,000 to 8,000 U.S. hedge 
funds that manage about $1.5 trillion in assets.62 Still, investor nervousness 
goes beyond the hardest-hit funds that invest in subprime mortgages and 
make use of quants. The anxious investor attempting to reach those in fund 
management kind of call has been common in recent months, where funds 
from smaller, rogue capital groups have posted large losses, but also the 
most highly reputable of funds, such as Goldman Sachs flagship Global 
Alpha fund have posted double digit drops.63 
Investors who successfully withdraw money from a struggling hedge 
fund may still be at risk. If a hedge fund fails, in some cases, a bankruptcy 
trustee or other investors may sue investors who have already redeemed 
money and try to force them to pay that money back into the fund.64 The 
trustee could argue that, the hedge fund did not value its assets correctly and 
that investors withdrew more money than they were entitled to, the lawyers 
                                                 
56 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Redemption Day: Will Hedge Fund Investors Bolt? NEW YORK TIMES. 
Available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/redemption-day-will-hedge-fund-
investors-bolt/ (last visited October 17, 2007). 
57 Supra note 37. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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62 Grace Wong, Hedge Fund Redemption Shock: Investors Looking to Cash Out This Fall May be Met 
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say.65 This concept may well apply to some of the fund failures right now, 
because some funds involved with, say, subprime-mortgage-related 
securities may have a hard time valuing their assets and could wind up in 
bankruptcy. “It’s the Hotel California syndrome, you can check out anytime 
you like, but you can never leave.”66 Investors need to read hedge fund 
offering documents and limited-partnership agreements carefully to 
understand redemption rules.67 Individual investors rarely read this language, 
and given the success of hedge funds in recent years, the efforts of the 
wealthy have all been focused on finding ways to get their money in to these 
funds, which tantalize with the potential for enormous return. 
In some cases, funds may impose a penalty on investors who try to 
withdraw money without giving proper notice or require longer redemption 
notice periods for investors who want to take out money at year end.68 In 
some cases, investors have negotiated in advance special agreements with 
hedge fund managers known as a “side letter”, which may allow the investor 
to redeem money more quickly than other investors in the fund. 69  The 
viability of securing this type of agreement with the fund manager is not 
likely to be equally shared by all hedge fund investors, even though 
individual investments in these funds are substantial. Often, such 
agreements are reserved for very large institutional investors such as 
endowments and pension funds.70 
Some funds will on occasion waive the redemption period, allowing 
anxious investors to exit early, but this sort of policy is very dependent on 
the given fund, as many funds are run very differently than others. 71 
Specifically, funds controlled by large investment banks will generally 
conduct themselves differently than individual funds that have no reputation 
outside the specific fund to be accountable to.72 As is evident from the 
turmoil resulting from the collapse of two large Bear funds, fund insolvency 
reflects extremely poorly on the credibility of an institution as a whole, 
something the large investment banks are well aware of in the current 
market. Regardless of fund management and these factors that may affect 
operation style, investors should be advised to be very active and vocal in 
their involvement with the fund manager. If an investor is thinking of 
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putting money into a fund, especially given the large amounts in question, 
they should be very persistent on securing contractual language that allows 
for clear and investor-friendly redemption, if at all possible. 
IV. REDEMPTION RELATED ISSUES AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
STATUTES 
As hedge funds are susceptible to collapse given their extreme 
leveraged positions, investors must be very aware of what fund managers 
are doing with money if matters go south. Issues of fraudulent conveyances 
have raised their head in these situations, and although these would appear 
likely to be the rogue funds without huge assets, no fund is immune from 
this line of questioning. Specific questions of law that must be examined are: 
how the fraudulent conveyance statute relates to redemption requests, and 
determining what is the definition of insolvency under the fraudulent 
conveyance statute. 
The basic definition of insolvent, to the lay individual, means the 
inability to pay debts. Under traditional legal definition73, a corporation is 
solvent if, and only if, it is able to pay all its debts, as and when they 
become due and payable (s95A of the Corporations Act). The Bankruptcy 
Act, however, refers to the debtor’s ability to pay debts “from his or her own 
money” (s122(4)(c)), as did older versions of corporate insolvency 
legislation.74 A recent decision suggests a corporation will not be required to 
be able to pay debts from its own moneys to demonstrate solvency.75 
In bankruptcy proceedings, a trustee is chosen to administer the 
debtor’s estate in a fair and orderly manner. 76  Generally speaking, for 
bankruptcy purposes, the estate is comprised of those assets of the debtors in 
which the debtor’s creditors have an interest.77  The trustee is given the 
power to set aside or “avoid” certain transfers of the debtor’s assets out of 
the estate that unfairly place assets beyond the creditor’s reach.78 Such a 
transfer of the debtor’s assets to a third party, with the intent to prevent 
creditors from reaching the assets to satisfy their claims, is called a 
                                                 
73 Refers to American Legal Conception of Insolvency as provided by the CORPORATIONS ACT. 
74 See THE BANKRUPTCY ACT (122(4)(c)). 
75 Under the Bankruptcy Code, insolvency exists when the sum of the debtor’s debts exceeds the fair 
value of the debtor's property, with some exceptions. It is a balance sheet test. 11 USC § 101(32). 
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“fraudulent conveyance”. 79  This is also referred to commonly as a 
“fraudulent transfer”, and for the purposes of this legal issue, the terms can 
be considered synonymous.80 
There are two types of fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy law. The first, 
actual fraud, involves the intent to defraud creditors, the other, sometimes 
called constructive fraud, involves a transfer, which is made in exchange for 
grossly inadequate consideration. 81  Actual fraud is committed when a 
transfer is made within one year before the date of the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition, and is made with the intent to hinder or defraud a creditor.82 Actual 
fraud requires proof of intent from the person challenging the transfer. Of 
course, a debtor intending to defraud his creditors will not be overt about his 
intentions to do so.83 
Therefore, courts have set forth circumstances which indicate the intent 
to defraud.84 Some examples of these circumstances are actual or threatened 
litigation against the debtor, retention of possession or control of the 
property, transfer of substantially all the debtor’s assets, transfer to a newly 
created corporation, and a special relationship with the person to whom the 
property is transferred. 85  These are only factors to be considered in 
determining whether a person intended to defraud a creditor, and whether 
they do in fact prove the debtor’s fraudulent intent is to be determined on a 
case by case basis.86 
One of the most important badges of fraud for purposes of assessing a 
fraudulent conveyance is the debtor’s insolvency, or solvency, before and 
after the conveyance in question. Most state statutes and other laws do not 
clearly define solvency or show how to measure solvency.87 The principle 
issue is whether assessment of solvency includes in the debtor’s assets those 
assets that are exempt from creditors such as homestead property, annuities 
and retirement funds. Computation of solvency under Bankruptcy law 
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excludes exempt assets; the tax code definition includes exempt assets.88 For 
example, Florida Statute 726.10389 states that, “a debtor is insolvent if the 
some of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets” or 
secondly, the debtor is generally not paying his debts when due.90 The first 
part of the Statute’s definition does not specify whether exempt assets are 
considered, and therefore, the second test of debt payment becomes most 
important.91 
Under the UFTA and Bankruptcy Code, different bases of valuation 
may be appropriate depending upon the circumstances, and different 
methods of determining value on any particular basis may be appropriate 
depending upon the business engaged in by the debtor and other factors.92. 
For a debtor which is a business enterprise, valuation on the basis of 
continuation of the business by the debtor as a going concern ordinarily 
would be the appropriate basis of valuation if, at the time as of which the 
valuation is made, it reasonably would be expected that, the enterprise will 
continue as a going concern.93 In such a case, appropriate values may be 
ascribed to goodwill and to non-assignable licenses, franchises, contracts 
and rights.94. Often it would be appropriate not to attempt to determine the 
value of separate assets and debts, but rather to determine only the 
“enterprise value” representing the aggregate difference between the 
debtor's assets and debts.95 
Enterprise value should be determined by methods appropriate under 
the circumstances which can include the capitalization or discounted cash 
flow methodology.96 Even if it is appropriate to value on a liquidation basis, 
this may mean carving up the company into smaller going concern units 
rather than a piecemeal forced liquidation. 97  In any event, the GAAP 
balance sheet, while a starting point for the analysis, is not dispositive of 
value.98 
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As set forth in Vadnais Lumber, the proper standard of valuation is the 
value of the business as a going concern, not the liquidation value of its 
assets less its liabilities, provided that, the business was a going concern at 
the time of the transfer. On the other hand, liquidation value is appropriate if, 
at the time of the transfer, the business is so close to shutting its doors that a 
going concern standard is unrealistic. In Vadnais Lumber, the court found 
that, although the business was weak after the transfer, the debtor was still 
able to continue its business operations without a bankruptcy for some 
period of time.99 
A reasonable construction of UFCA §4 indicates that, it not only 
encompasses insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, but also includes a 
condition wherein a debtor has insufficient presently salable assets to pay 
existing debts as they mature.100 If a debtor has a deficit net worth, then the 
present salable value of his assets must be less than the amount required to 
pay the liability on his debts as they mature. A debtor may have substantial 
paper net worth including assets which have a small salable value, but 
which if held to a subsequent date could have a much higher salable 
value.101 Nevertheless, if the present salable value of assets is less than the 
amount required to pay existing debts as they mature the debtor is 
insolvent.102 
V. BAYOU BANKRUPTCY SCENARIO 
Risks to hedge fund investors may now linger even after they have 
redeemed their interests in the funds. Such a notion of risk long after exit 
seems unlikely, but if the receiver, acting as Chapter 11 manager of the 
defunct Bayou hedge funds, ultimately prevails in actions to recover $140 
million from investors who withdrew from the funds within two years of 
bankruptcy filings. 103  According to a February 23, 2007 decision by a 
                                                 
99 See also, Moody v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 971 F. 2d 1056, 1076-69 (3d Cir. 1992); 
In re Taxman Clothing Co., 905 F. 2d 166, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (under Bankruptcy Code avoidance 
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a debtor’s assets and liabilities. See, e.g., Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A. 2d 1037 (R.I. 1997); Cellar v. 
Holley, 9 Ohio App. 2d 288 (1967); Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604 (1963). 
102 Peter Lattman, Bankrupt Bayou Wants Its Money Back, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 30, 2007, at 
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http://www.bayoucaymanliquidation.ky/committee.htm (last visited October 17, 2007). 
103 Diya Gullapalli, Fund Track: Buyout Boom Helps Some Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at 
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bankruptcy judge in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of 
New York, denying the motions to dismiss in 95 separate lawsuits against 
the redeeming investors, the complaints stated enough to make a prima facie 
case to recover both principal and “profits” as fraudulent conveyances under 
federal and state law.104 
What the plaintiffs know about the operations of the Bayou hedge 
funds over their nine-year history is derived largely from the criminal 
complaints against the principal organizers Samuel Israel III and Daniel 
Marino and their guilty pleas. 105  Israel and Marino, who are currently 
awaiting sentencing, admitted to lying to investors in the Bayou hedge funds 
by sending the investors regular reports that contained fictitious rates of 
return on trading and inflated net asset values in order to conceal losses.106 
The facts in the criminal actions, largely parroted in the complaints 
against the redeeming investors, were accepted as true by the court in 
denying the dismissal motions. 107  However, whether the profits each 
investor received were “fictitious” and the hedge funds were insolvent or 
rendered insolvent at the time, each of the redeeming investors were paid 
must still be developed by the plaintiffs from a reconstruction of books and 
records and proven at trial. 108  It is estimated that, the non-redeeming 
investors of four domestic funds and one offshore fund are owed $250 
million before distributions from a victims’ fund set up by the U.S. 
Department of Justice to compensate these investors for their losses.109 
There is currently more than $106 million in the victims’ fund from assets 
seized and collected by various state and federal agencies.110 
The plaintiffs hope to make up some of the shortfall for the non-
redeeming investors from those who redeemed in whole or in part before the 
collapse, notwithstanding the fact that, none of the redeeming investors are 
accused of having participated in the fraud. Those efforts have been 
vigorously opposed by the defendants who sought dismissal of the lawsuits 
collectively based on a decision in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that 
insulates payments from recovery on an intentional fraudulent conveyance 
theory when such payments are made to satisfy an antecedent debt.111 
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The defendants argued that, they fit within the Sharp protections 
because they had existing claims for rescission or restitution against the 
hedge funds based on the fraudulent inducement to invest that were satisfied 
with the redemption payments.112 The defendants also attempted to rebut the 
contention that, the hedge funds were operated as a massive Ponzi scheme 
on the grounds that operations had none of the characteristics of a classic 
Ponzi scheme: there were no promises of unrealistic or high returns, Bayou 
had substantial business operations, and the redeeming investors were not 
paid out by late investors in the hedge funds.113 
The ramifications of this decision are clearly not positive for the 
investor community. It leaves investors with significant uncertainty even 
after they have redeemed their investment from a fund as they continue to 
be exposed to risk of loss, if only the cost of litigation, should a situation 
such as Bayou arise.114 The possibility of such occurrences is certainly a 
negative in the eyes of large investors, particularly scrutinized institutional 
investors. Furthermore, the general negative light under which hedge funds 
are portrayed is exacerbated by such activity, meaning that, the actions in 
liquidation by other funds will be highly scrutinized, and transfers will have 
to clearly pass the test to not qualify as fraudulent, or face likely court 
intervention. 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
denied a motion to dismiss made by investors who had redeemed their 
interests in three Bayou hedge funds in the two years prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.115 The bankruptcy trustee sought to clawback payments made to these 
investors pursuant to the “fraudulent conveyance” provision in the 
Bankruptcy Code that permits clawback of payments made by a debtor with 
intent to defraud other creditors.116 The three Bayou hedge funds are alleged 
to have significantly inflated their net asset values and to have utilized a 
fictitious accounting firm to “audit” their returns starting in 1999, before the 
fraud was uncovered and the Bayou funds collapsed in 2005.117 
During 2003-2005, investors who redeemed their interests in the Bayou 
funds received redemption proceeds based on the false inflated NAVs 
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reported by the Bayou funds. 118  The court ruled that, the redemption 
payments are subject to clawback under the fraudulent conveyance statute 
and thus denied the investors’ motion to dismiss.119 It further ruled, however, 
that the redemption payments received by the investors may be subject to a 
good faith defense but that more evidence is needed to determine whether 
the good faith defense is available to these investors.120 
CONCLUSION 
Dealings in extreme leverage mean that, there will be volatility. With 
risk spread throughout the market by quants and funds of funds, exacerbated 
by the copycat nature of the hedge fund business, many legal implications 
come to the foreground in terms of getting money out of these funds, and 
exposure to risk in cases of fund bankruptcy. Hedge funds will likely to 
continue to grow in power. Some funds will fail, but such is the nature of 
capital markets, compounded by leveraged positions. 
This does not mean that, hedge funds will all be in trouble; on the 
contrary, hedge funds will continue to play an increasingly important part in 
the global economy. Hedge funds, along with private equity, oil money 
from the Middle East and Asian Central banks, have been noted to be the 
big players for the future of the global economy.121 The more hedge funds 
there are, the more they become integral to our capital market system, and 
the higher percentage of daily trade volume they will occupy. This also 
means that, by sheer numbers, more funds will invariable collapse. The 
legal system must be prepared to deal with these collapses. Also, the 
economy and its investors need to realize that collapse of funds is bound to 
happen, but that these will not mean that, many funds will not continue to 
yield amazing return. 
Fund collapse will not be a regular phenomenon, but will happen on 
occasion, likely as a result of market conditions that expose the risk of 
dealing with positions of extreme leverage. Investors in these funds should 
be very aware of the partnership agreement provision or corporate 
organizational provision that governs the withdrawal of funds. Those who 
have money in hedge funds should be cognizant of the fact that, unlike 
mutual funds, hedge funds do not have mandatory seven day withdrawal 
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provisions, and because of the secretive nature of hedge funds, it is often 
hard to get answers on exact policy. Because fund collapse has not been in 
the forefront of concern in recent years of great leveraged success, it is 
important that, legal issues be examined for future reference, especially 
given the massive amounts of capital being pooled into hedge funds. 
Fraudulent transfers come into the forefront of legal concern in the case 
of insolvency of funds, or even in liquidation attempts prior to complete 
insolvency. Because hedge funds manage such vast amounts of capital and 
can often be in positions of sizable risk, quick actions and dispersal of funds, 
coupled with redemption requests in quick succession, can lead to problems 
mirroring the proverbial run on the bank. 
The Bayou collapse brings together all of the legal issues related to 
redemption requests, fund insolvency, fraudulent transfers and the ugly 
prospect of transfer liability.122 During 2003-2005, investors who redeemed 
their interests in the Bayou funds received redemption proceeds based on 
the false inflated NAVs reported by the Bayou funds.123 The court ruled that, 
the redemption payments are subject to clawback under the fraudulent 
conveyance statute and thus denied the investors’ motion to dismiss.124 It 
further ruled, however, that the redemption payments received by the 
investors may be subject to a good faith defense but that more evidence is 
needed to determine whether the good faith defense is available to these 
investors.125 This evidence will be expensive and time-consuming to collect, 
and is the type of work that generates high legal fees and is going to 
frustrate those with money in funds, regardless of ultimate outcome.126 
The events of Bayou, as well as the Bankruptcy Court treatment of the 
Bear Stearns funds to this point, provide a template by which to analyze the 
possibilities for future developments in the area.127 Important to recognize is 
that, Bayou represents the legal ramifications for what is possible if the fund 
managers are willing to engage in fraudulent conduct. This will not always 
be the case in the event of collapse. With Bear Stearns’ collapse, this type of 
behavior is less likely to occur. However, the ramifications of Bayou 
demonstrate that, this type of conduct is possible, and given that large, 
respected funds are susceptible to collapse, the complete range of legal 
consequences must be considered in order to fully advise investors what 
they could possibly be forced to deal with. 
                                                 
122 Supra note 98. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Supra note 105. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
52                US-CHINA LAW REVIEW            Vol. 13: 34 
 
Fraudulent transfer situations present nightmare for the elite, asset rich 
investors who generally engage in hedge fund speculation, likely giving rise 
to liability that they never thought possible when putting their money into a 
hedge fund. Even if no fraudulent transfers occur, it is imperative that, 
investors recognize their rights with respect to redemption, be that if they 
simply want to redeem funds for fear of downswing, or in cases of 
insolvency. 
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THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS AND UNANIMITY 
WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Christian Guillermet Fernández & David Fernández Puyana 
Consensus is a process of non-violent conflict resolution. Everyone 
works together to make the best possible decision for the group. All 
concerns are raised and addressed, until all voices are heard. Since 
proposals are not the property of the presenter, a solution can be made 
cooperatively. Reaching consensus on a proposal does not mean that, 
everyone is in agreement1. Consensus decision making is a creative and 
dynamic way of reaching agreement between all members of a group. 
Instead of simply voting for an item and having the majority of the group 
getting their way, a group using consensus is committed to finding solutions 
that, everyone actively supports, or at least can live with. At the heart of 
consensus is a respectful dialogue between equals. It is about helping 
groups to work together to meet both the individual’s and the group’s needs. 
Consensus is looking for “win-win” solutions that are acceptable to all, 
with the direct benefit that everyone agrees with the final decision, resulting 
in a greater commitment to actually turning it into reality. Consensus seeks 
to synthesize the wisdom of the group unity: everyone has a piece of the 
truth2. The recent adoption by 195 States of the “Paris Agreement” in the 
context of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference is a “good 
example” of consensus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will analyse the historical roots of consensus decision 
making. In particular, the elaboration of this type of decision making 
process by the three main religions (i.e. Christian, Muslim and Jewish) and 
indigenous peopleswill carefully be analysed. Both the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy and the Hanseatic League decisively influenced this approach 
in some legal systems. 
Additionally, an assessment about the rule of unanimity accepted by 
the League of Nations will also studied, in the context of the debate about 
the efficiency of this rule held at the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law. 
They concluded that, resolutions or instruments on questions affecting the 
well-being of humankind as a whole could not be adopted against the will of 
some other States. 
Finally, a reflection about consensus building within the United 
Nations, and in particular the Security Council, the General Assembly and 
the Human Rights Council will be provided, concluding with an emphasis 
that, the adoption of resolutions by consensus is the clear tendency and 
practice at the United Nations. In fact, some intergovernmental 
organizations, specialized agencies and social movements have expressly 
accepted consensus in their respective rules of procedures and have also 
concluded that, the term “consensus” refers to an established practice under 
which every effort is made to reach without vote an agreement that is 
generally accepted. 
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING 
One of the most widely cited historical roots for consensus decision-
making is the Quakers traditions and to a lesser extent, the Anabaptists of 
which perhaps the best known descendents are the Mennonites3. 
Consensus as a decision-making formula has served the Jewish 
communal system throughout much of the 20th century. In understanding 
the term “consensus”, we find the following core definition: “the collective 
opinion by most of those concerned.” Rela Mintz Geffen, in 1997, 
acknowledged that, consensual decision-making was one of the core 
“constitutional principles” that served to define the Jewish experience in 
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America4. 
Ijmā is an Arabic term referring to the consensus or agreement of the 
Muslim community basically on religious issues. Various schools of thought 
within Islamic jurisprudence may define this consensus to be that of the first 
generation of Muslims only; or the consensus of the first three generations 
of Muslims; or the consensus of the jurists and scholars of the Muslim world, 
or scholarly consensus; or the consensus of all the Muslim world, both 
scholars and laymen5. 
Another common reference in the quest for consensus decision-
making’s heritage are indigenous peoples. Many peoples from different 
parts of the globe are cited. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy are frequently 
mentioned (sometimes referred to as the Iroquois League—the name given 
to them by the French). The confederacy still exists today6. 
In 1987, the U.S. Senate formally acknowledged, in a special 
resolution, the influence of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace on the 
U.S. Constitution, as follows: 
“Acknowledges the historical debt of the United States to the Iroquois 
Confederacy, and other Indian nations for their demonstration of democratic 
principles and their example of a free association of independent Indian 
nations”.7 
Other indigenous peoples are quoted as using consensus, for example 
African Bushmen. Usually, this seems to be defined as a system of decision-
making in which a council of elders makes decisions based on a consensus 
of the wider community8. This form of decision making process still is 
applied in many African countries. 
The Hanseatic League is another example of a group that utilizes 
strong elements of what we understand to be consensus in their governance 
structure. The League was “an economic alliance of trading cities and their 
merchant guilds that dominated trade along the coast of Northern Europe. It 
stretched from the Baltic to the North Sea and inland during the Late Middle 
Ages and early modern period (c. 13th-17th centuries)”9. 
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The European Union follows the historical example of the Diet of the 
Hanseatic League about the rule of consensus10. In particular, Art. 16.4 of 
the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon decrees that, “except where the 
Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Council shall be taken 
by consensus”. 
II. THE RULE OF UNANIMITY IN THE PRACTICE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
The Hague Peace Conferences supported the traditional doctrine of 
unanimity, but disguised them “by the fiction of quasi-unanimity”, which 
recognized as unanimously accepted a proposal receiving a substantial 
majority of the votes cast. Certain proposals of the Proceedings of the First 
Hague Conference were adopted unanimously with the exception of two 
votes—United States and Great Britain—and one abstention—Portugal—”11. 
At the close of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles established the 
League of Nations which stipulates in Article 5 of its Covenant, the 
unanimity rule for all decisions of the Council or Assembly except as 
otherwise expressly provided in the Covenant. Consequently, voting in the 
League of Nations was normally based on the so-called unanimity rule12. 
Under the League Covenant, the Council was governed by the 
unanimity rule except in procedural matters, and this proved a serious 
handicap, particularly when the Council was acting under Article 11 of the 
Covenant. It was possible for a member of the Council, accused of 
threatening or disturbing the peace, to prevent any effective action under 
this Article by the interposition of its veto, as happened in the case of 
Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and the threat of Italian 
aggression in Ethiopia in 193513. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice stated that, the rule of 
unanimity was “in accordance with the unvarying tradition of all diplomatic 
meetings or conferences” and noted that, in the Council of the League, 
“observance of the rule of unanimity is naturally and even necessarily 
indicated”14. 
Additionally, the Permanent Court also added in regards to the organs 
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of the League of Nations that, “in a body constituted in this way, whose 
mission is to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League 
or affecting the peace of the world, observance of the rule of unanimity is 
naturally and even necessarily indicated …. Moreover, it is hardly 
conceivable that, resolutions on questions affecting the peace of the world 
could be adopted against the will of those amongst the members of the 
Council who, although in a minority, would, by reason of their political 
position, have to bear the larger share of the responsibilities and 
consequences ensuing therefrom”15. 
When the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law 
met in 1930, the President of the Conference (Heemskerk, the Netherlands) 
stated that, “we should maintain the principle that, we must adopt 
unanimous resolutions and that unless we do so, we cannot have any 
codification of international law” 16 . On the other hand, While Politis 
(Greece) agreed that, “it was undoubtedly the wish of all to take unanimous 
decisions and also added that, no State or minority group of States will be 
permitted at this Conference to prevent the majority from embodying the 
results of its deliberations in a diplomatic instrument”17. 
Proponents of consensus and unanimity consider it to have many 
advantages over majority voting, because it cultivates discussion, 
participation and responsibility, and avoids the so-called “tyranny of the 
majority”. However, the drawback is a lengthy and difficult decision 
making process18. 
The so-called unanimity rule has been much criticized. Critics often 
tend to lose sight of that fact that, the League was an association of 
independent states and must proceed by the way of unanimous compromise 
and not by majorities imposing decisions on minorities. No state today will 
put itself in the position of being legally compelled to take action or commit 
its national policy by a vote of foreign powers19. 
A text is said to be adopted by consensus when all the members of the 
organ tasked with taking the decision give their tacit consent. No voting 
takes place. Consensus differs from unanimity which is an explicit 
agreement, resulting from a vote in which all members cast a vote. In 
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summary: a consensus is obtained without voting when no one opposes the 
decision, and unanimity is when everyone agrees and votes in favour of the 
text. 
III. APPROACH TO CONSENSUS BUILDING WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS 
The main change introduced into the United Nations since 1945 was 
the abolition of the unanimity rule and the decentralization and dissipation 
of the functional competence, through various organs, with a residuary and 
coordinating power of control in the General Assembly’s exclusive 
competence over the United Nations budget20. 
The substitution of majority decisions for unanimity in the drafting of 
international conventions will have far-reaching consequences. This issue 
was discussed by the General Assembly in its fifth and sixth session on the 
subject of reservations to multilateral conventions, and it also relevant that, 
the International Court of Justice has drawn its attention to this aspect as 
follows: 
“The majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of multilateral 
conventions, may also make it necessary for certain States to make 
reservations”21. 
If the unanimity rule in the past led to a tendency to overplay the 
unattainable high standard, which had as a consequence that, agreements 
could be watered-down by representing the minimum to which all States 
would or could agree, the abolition of unanimity was perceived as an 
example of progress and democracy. However, this abolition led to other 
consequences, such as, firstly, it did not make easier the work to draft 
worth-while conventions having universal effects and secondly, it resulted 
in a multiplication of reservations going to the root of the agreements. 
Consequently, the question raised is whether the price of the abolition of 
unanimity was not too high22. 
As was the practice prior to the First World War, the text of a 
multilateral convention has to be adopted by unanimity. Unanimous consent 
as regards the admissibility of reservations was the logical concomitant of 
the unanimity rule applying to the establishment of the text of multilateral 
conventions23. 
In the context of a proposal (E/CN.9/L. 110) on the rules of procedure 
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of the World Population Conference, the President of the Conference 
wanted to know whether the decisions on important matters related to the 
substance should be adopted, if possible, by consensus. 
In 1974, the Director of the General Legal Division at the Office of UN 
Legal Affairs made a statement about the use of the term consensus in the 
United Nations practice in the following terms24: 
“No plenipotentiary conference under United Nations auspices had included 
in its rules of procedure a provision on consensus, partly due to the fact that it 
was somewhat difficult to arrive at an exact definition of consensus, and partly 
because the objective which was usually sought, namely, that every effort should 
be made to achieve a consensus before a vote was taken, could better be achieved 
by simply an understanding at the beginning of the conference. In United Nations 
organs, the term ‘consensus’ was used to describe a practice under which every 
effort is made to achieve unanimous agreement; but if that could not be done, 
those dissenting from the general trend were prepared simply to make their 
position or reservations known and placed on the record”. 
The consensus system assures that, decision-making as a multilateral 
negotiation of a legal instrument will not be dominated by the numerical 
superiority of any group of nations. Since it is difficult to obtain acceptance 
of voting systems that, overtly recognize the differences in nations’ 
importance, the consensus approach permits the maintenance of an 
egalitarian procedure which in practice may assure that, multilateral 
negotiations reflect the real geopolitical power of the participating nations25.  
It follows that, consensus decision making is “an attempt to achieve an 
agreement of all the participants in a multilateral conference without the 
need for a vote and its inevitable divisiveness”26. In other words, it is an 
agreement of all taken unanimously by means other than voting and 
consequently, “the effort to achieve consensus … protects the interests of 
those who risk becoming permanent minorities at each institution”27. 
Consensus decision making as a mode of procedure became popular in 
the 1970s, as a result of the growing number of independent states taking an 
active part in international politics. These large number of independent 
states were welcomed to take part in the international organizations through 
the encouragement of an “international governance of many” or 
                                                 
24 Summary of a statement made at the 311th meeting of the Population Commission, on March 6, 
1974. 
25 Buzan B., Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (1981). 
26 BERRIDGE G. R., DIPLOMACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (3rd ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
2005). 
27 Kahler M., Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals, 24 (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics 2001). 
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multilateralism which was linked with the principle of “the sovereign 
equality of states”28. 
A. Security Council 
Since the three vetoes by Russia and China over Syria in 2011 and 
2012, and the inability of the Security Council to find a solution to the 
conflict, there has been a common perception that the Council is divided. 
Likewise, following the war in Iraq in 2003, the Council was viewed as 
having become badly fractured. However, looking at decisions adopted, the 
Council is actually divided on just a limited number of issues and otherwise 
largely operates by consensus29. 
Presidential statements require consensus, and press statements are 
issued only with the agreement of all 15 members. All sanctions committees, 
with a few exceptions, and working groups also operate by consensus. 
Resolutions, which are put to a vote, are the only Council outcome that can 
be adopted with or without the unanimity of the Council. Most resolutions, 
however, have been adopted by consensus: 93.5 percent of those adopted 
since 2000 to December 15, 2013. Contrary to public perceptions, this is a 
noticeable increase from 88.9 percent in the 1990s, a period when the 
Security Council was viewed as highly active, and comparatively more 
effective and less divided due to the end of the Cold War30. 
Consensus in Council decision-making seems to be the preferred mode 
even during years that generated bitter feelings among members. Despite 
recent divisions on Syria or prior to and following the 2003 Iraq war, 
consensus resolutions during these periods still prevailed at levels above 92 
percent. Thus, it seems that, either the Council looks at the merits of each 
situation instead of allowing divisions on specific issues to permeate into its 
other work, or it makes a more concerted effort to at least appear united on 
other fronts31. 
B. General Assembly 
Each of the 193 Member States in the Assembly has one vote. Votes 
                                                 
28 Kahler M., Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE 
THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 295 (J. Ruggie ed., New York: Columbia University 
Press 1993). 
29 In Hindsight: Consensus in the Security Council, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (New York, January 
2014). 
30 In Hindsight: Consensus in the Security Council, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (New York, January 
2014). 
31 Op. cit. 30. 
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taken on designated important issues—such as recommendations on peace 
and security, the election of the Security Council and Economic and Social 
Council members, and budgetary questions—require a two-thirds majority 
of Member States, but other questions are decided by simple majority32. 
During the Cold War, the United Nations was very divided, and it was 
difficult for resolutions to pass with more than 60%-70% support of the 
members. Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has 
increasingly tried to work toward consensus, where many resolutions are 
adopted unanimously by all voting members. In recent years, an effort has 
been made to achieve consensus on issues, rather than deciding by a formal 
vote, thus strengthening support for the Assembly’s decisions. 
Additionally, it should be noted that, the rule of consensus has been 
included in the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly in its Article 
104 with regards to financial issues, as follows: 
“The Special Committee considers that, the adoption of decisions and 
resolutions by consensus is desirable when it contributes to the effective and 
lasting settlement of differences, thus strengthening the authority of the United 
Nations. It wishes, however, to emphasize that, the right of every Member State 
to set forth its view in full must not be prejudiced by this procedure”. 
Unlike decisions regarding treaties and conventions, in which the 
system of reservations is applied by States, the adoption by consensus of 
Declarations on peace matters by the General Assembly has been a clear 
tendency since the creation of the United Nations. 
In particular, it should also be recalled that, the Declaration on the 
Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and 
Understanding between Peoples of 1965, the Declaration on the Protection 
of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict of 1974, 
Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace 
and Co-operation of 1982 and the Political Declaration on the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts in Africa of 2013, were adopted by consensus. 
Neither the Declaration on Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace of 1978, 
the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace of 1984 nor the Declaration 
and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace of 1999 were adopted by 
the General Assembly with the opposition of regional groups. 
Finally, it should also be noted that, most of Declarations, Rules and 
Guidelines on human rights adopted by the General Assembly since 1945 
were adopted by consensus. In particular, the General Assembly has adopted 
around thirty Declarations in different fields of human rights, such as 
                                                 
32 See Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml. 
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children rights, racial discrimination, persons with disabilities, women, 
enforced disappearance, development, among others, after all different 
regional groups reached relevant agreements 33 . Only three important 
Declarations on human rights were adopted with some opposition, such as 
Declaration on the Right to Development34  or Indigenous Peoples35 , or 
abstentions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights36. But the 
rest of Declarations have been adopted by consensus. 
Most of the declarations contain political statements only and thus have 
no binding effect in international law. However, the General Assembly has 
often adopted declarations which, although non-binding, have influenced 
the development of international law or in some cases have been regarded as 
reflecting customary law on the relevant topic. For this reason, the 
consensus or unanimity in the decision making process within the General 
Assembly has been critical in order to advance international law, and reflect 
                                                 
33 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination; Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual 
Respect and Understanding between Peoples; Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women; Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons; Declaration on the 
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict; Declaration on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Political declaration on Africa’s 
development needs; United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training; Political 
declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary 
of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action “United against racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”; Political declaration of the High-level Meeting 
of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases; Political 
Declaration on the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law; Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS; 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; 
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines); 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty; Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of Prisoners, The protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care; Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; 
Standard rules on the equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women; Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace; Millennium 
declaration; United Nations Declaration on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; Declaration on 
Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference 
to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
34 1 Vote against and 8 Abstentions. 
35 4 Vote against and 11 Abstentions. 
36 8 Abstentions. 
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the existence of a particular customary law among all States. 
C. Human Rights Council 
In accordance with Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure, the Council 
applies the rule of majority of votes for the adoption of resolutions and 
decisions. However, it should also recalled that, the “United Nations Human 
Rights Council: Institution-Building” 37  establishes that, the search for 
consensus plays an important role in the negotiation process. In particular, 
Article 127 indicates that: 
“The sponsors of a draft resolution or decision should hold open-ended 
consultations on the text of their draft resolution(s) or decision(s) with a view to 
achieving the widest participation in their consideration and, if possible, 
achieving consensus on them”. 
Consensus in the decision-making process has had an important effect 
in the works of the Council since its inception. Most of resolutions are 
adopted by consensus, representing around 82% of the totality of them. 
The most controversial resolutions are those related to country situation, 
notably, Belarus, Syria, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, Iran, North-
Korea, the occupied Syrian Golan. 
Additionally, the Council has widely worked on topics, which have not 
been supported by all Council members, such as foreign debt, right of 
peoples to peace, international solidarity, integrity of the judicial system, 
non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin, the promotion of a democratic and 
equitable international order, the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed 
drones in counter-terrorism and military operations, promotion and 
protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, unilateral 
coercitive measures, right to development, mercenaries and sexual 
orientation and gender identity. 
D. Other Intergovernmental Bodies, United Nations Agencies and Social 
Movements 
In the disarmament affairs, all resolutions are adopted by consensus. In 
fact, in the rules of procedure of the Conference of Disarmament, the rule of 
consensus is compulsory for the adoption of resolutions. 
                                                 
37 UNGA Resolution 5/1, INSTITUTION-BUILDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
(June 18, 2007). 
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In addition, many conventions and treaties on disarmament operate 
through the rule of consensus among all countries. In particular, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention specifies in its Article 18 that, “… decisions 
on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus”. In 
addition, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention regulates in Article 6 
that, “… the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the 
States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus”. The 
Arms Trade Treaty also indicates in Article 17.2 that, “the Conference of 
States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first 
session”. Finally, the Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok treaties also 
specify that decisions shall be taken by consensus. 
The principle of consensus has been adopted by the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Executive Committee of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)38. 
It should be noted the extension of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) system to certain of the Specialized Agencies, which 
expressly rejected the decision-making process adopted by the United 
Nations39. It is significant to stress that, the undesirable features derived 
from the abolition of unanimity in 1945 by the United Nations are less in 
evidence in the ILO Conventions. The ILO system was partially extended to 
certain of Specialized Agencies, notably United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) and International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which has permitted them a more 
satisfactory progress at the technical, legal and functional level40. 
In accordance with Article 28 of the Rules applicable to the Governing 
Body of the International Labour Office, the agenda of each session is 
determined by a tripartite screening group, which will take the decisions, to 
the extent possible, by consensus. If there is no consensus, the issue will be 
referred to the Officers. 
The ILO understands consensus as the following: 
“… The term ‘consensus’ refers to an established practice under which 
every effort is made to reach without vote an agreement that is generally accepted. 
                                                 
38 Movsisyan M., Decision Making by Consensus in International Organizations as a Form of 
Negotiation, 1(3) 21-ST CENTURY 78. 
39 Rosenne SH., United Nations Treaty Practice, 86(II) RECUEIL DES COURS 313 (1954). 
40 Rosenne SH., op. cit. 39, 315. 
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Those dissenting from the general trend are prepared simply to make their 
position or reservations known and placed on the record …”41. 
The rule of consensus is also applied in the procedure for the 
elaboration, examination, adoption and follow-up of declarations, charters 
and similar standard-setting instruments adopted by the General Conference 
of UNESCO. In particular, stage 3 indicates that, “the declaration, charter or 
similar standard-setting instrument shall be adopted by a resolution of the 
General Conference. Every effort shall be made to adopt the declaration, 
charter or similar standard-setting instrument by consensus”42. 
A “good example” of consensus is the recent adoption by 195 States of 
the Paris Agreement in the context of the 2015 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference, COP 21 held in Paris (France), from November 30 to 
December 12, 2015. With the following words pronounced by Laurent 
Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France “I do not see any objection in 
the room, I declare the Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted”, 
consensus was achieved by all States. 
The feminist and anti-nuclear movements of the 1970s are often 
credited with the pioneering of consensus as many activists know it today. 
Ethan Mitchell cites 4 US-based organisations—the Federation of 
International Communities, the American Friends’ Service Committee, the 
Clamshell Alliance and Food Not Bombs43. 
The consensus process has also been used within political movements, 
non-profit organizations, intentional communities and worker cooperatives. 
Recently, consensus decision-making is being embraced by government 
entities and corporations (i.e. Mitsubishi, Levi Strauss & Co., and Starbucks)44. 
CONCLUSION 
The roots of the consensus decision making process can be found in the 
three main religions (i.e. Christian, Muslim and Jewish) and indigenous 
peoples. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, the Hanseatic League and 
Bushmen have all decisively shaped some legal systems, namely the United 
States of America and European Union and still continue influencing in 
many African countries. 
Additionally, the League of Nations stipulated in Article 5 of its 
                                                 
41 Article  46, Rules Applicable to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, (Geneva: 
International Labour Organization 2001). 
42 Adopted by the General Conference at its 33rd session, 33 C/Resolutions, 141-2. 
43 Op. cit. 3. 
44 Op. cit. 3. 
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Covenant the unanimity rule for all decisions of the Council or Assembly 
except as otherwise expressly provided in the Covenant. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice concluded that, resolutions or instruments on 
questions affecting the well-being of humankind as a whole could not be 
adopted against the will of some other States. Additionally, the President of 
the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law stressed in 
1930 that, the international community should adopt unanimous resolutions 
and that unless we do so, we cannot have any codification of international 
law. 
Despite abolishing the unanimity rule in 1945, the adoption of 
resolutions by consensus has continued to be the clear tendency and practice 
at the United Nations since its inception. In 1974, the Director of the 
General Legal Division at the Office of UN Legal Affairs concluded that, 
every effort should be made to achieve a consensus before a vote and that, 
this term was used to describe a practice under which all efforts are made to 
achieve unanimous agreements. 
Because of the inability of the United Nations to find a solution to 
some conflicts and problems, there has been a common perception that, 
States are divided in the main UN bodies, namely the Security Council, the 
General Assembly or the Human Rights Council. However, looking at 
decisions adopted, the United Nations is actually divided on just a limited 
number of issues and otherwise largely operates by consensus. In particular, 
most of the Declarations on peace matters and human rights adopted by the 
General Assembly since 1945 have always been adopted by consensus. 
Finally, important intergovernmental organizations, specialized 
agencies and social movements have expressly accepted consensus in their 
respective rules of procedures and have also concluded that, the term 
“consensus” refers to an established practice under which every effort is 
made to reach without vote an agreement that is generally accepted. 
In conclusion, the consensus system assures that, decision-making 
regarding a legal instrument recognize the differences among nations and 
also permits the maintenance of an egalitarian procedure which in practice 
may assure that, multilateral negotiations reflect the real geopolitical power 
of all participating nations. 
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The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Consular Relations, 
Representation of states and their relations with international organizations 
of universal character, as well the Convention on Special Missions which 
codifies the modern diplomatic law, with its diverse, elastic solutions 
enabled the states to use combinations of numerous possibilities of 
collection of functions and offices, in the target of the rational use of its 
diplomatic-consular network and of the networks of other countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961, 
contributed a lot to culmination on diplomatic and consular functions, 
allowing the diplomatic missions to perform consular functions. In fact 
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Convention provides that: “Nothing in the 
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present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of 
consular functions by a diplomatic mission”. This provision fills the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, adopted in 1963, which in Article 3 
specifically stipulates that: “consular functions can perform the diplomatic 
missions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention”. In the 
Article 70 of the Convention states that, its provisions “the provisions of the 
present Convention apply also, so far as the context permits, to the exercise 
of consular functions by a diplomatic mission” and that, the names of the 
members of diplomatic missions which are designated for consular 
departments of the mission or are otherwise certain to perform consular 
functions, will be appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
receiving State or by other authority that will be determined by the relevant 
ministry. With the same article of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, is finally solved one practical question about the status of the 
members of the diplomatic missions who perform consular functions, which 
over the years has been the subject not only of academic discourse, but also 
of serious different opinions in the proceeding of codification of the 
diplomatic law: if those persons have the right of privileges and immunities 
as members of diplomatic missions, i.e. according to the rules of the Vienna 
Convention on diplomatic relations or as members of consular relations. 
After a series of serious discussions of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, it is adopted that, privileges and immunities of the members of 
diplomatic missions who perform consular functions stipulated in 
compliance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relationships for 
performing of consular functions such persons do not lose the privileges and 
immunities as members of diplomatic missions, by which finally an end is 
put to the views of individual countries that the performing of consular 
functions by members of diplomatic missions is related to the denial of the 
diplomatic status and their deepening by the status consulate members, with 
extremely reduced privileges and immunities. 
I. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
Republic of Macedonia promotes its national values and interests 
through foreign policy—on bilateral and multilateral plan. European and 
Trans-Atlantic integration is a vital interest for long-term stability, security 
and prosperity of the Republic of Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia is 
committed to fulfillment of five foreign-policy priorities: NATO 
membership and a date for the beginning accession negotiations for full 
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membership in the European Union, abolition of visas for Macedonian 
citizens, overcoming of the issue of the name difference imposed by our 
southern neighbor and reinforcement of the economic and public diplomacy. 
Republic of Macedonia has fulfilled all the criteria for NATO membership 
and has implemented the necessary reforms. In the declaration of the NATO 
Summit in Bucharest, our commitment to the values and operational 
activities of NATO and the progress in the reform process was clearly 
acknowledged. Due to the opposition of the Republic of Greece, the 
invitation for NATO membership, the Alliance will send after finding a 
mutually acceptable solution to the issue about the difference over the name 
of the Republic of Macedonia, for which talks have been holding under the 
auspices of the United Nations. The membership of the Republic of 
Macedonia in NATO will mean long-term stability and security not only for 
the Balkans but for the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole and the beginning of 
the finalization of the concept of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. In the 
relations with the European Union, the main commitment of the Republic of 
Macedonia is to start negotiations for accessions as soon as possible and to 
this end the Government and state institutions work devotedly to the 
fulfillment of the priorities of the Accession Partnership from 2008. We 
expect that, during 2009, our efforts and achievements to be evaluated by 
European Commission recommendation to start accession negotiations, 
followed by appropriate decision by the European Council. The Republic of 
Macedonia expects early and successful termination of the dialogue on visa 
regime liberalization with the European Union. In relation to the established 
significant progress in meeting of the conditions of the Roadmap for visa 
liberalization, we expect at the beginning of 2009, from the European 
Commission to initiate a legal proceeding in the Council of EU to lift the 
visa regime for Macedonia and the entry into force of the visa-free regime 
during 2009. Republic of Macedonia participates constructively and actively 
in the negotiation process under the auspices of the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Matthew Nimetz to overcome the 
irrational issue imposed by the Republic of Greece concerning the 
difference about the name of our country. Republic of Macedonia is 
continuously engaged in finding a mutually acceptable solution that would 
not infringe on the Macedonian national identity, language and culture. 
Republic of Macedonia is committed to continuously strengthening of the 
strategic partnership with the United States and developing of 
comprehensive partnership relations with member states of the EU and 
NATO, whereupon pays particular attention to the relations and cooperation 
with other important actors on the international stage, primarily with the 
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Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. In the relations and 
cooperation with the neighboring countries, a good-neighborliness and 
friendship and readiness for comprehensive cooperation in many areas of 
mutual interest is promoted. Good neighborly relations as one of the 
priorities in the foreign policy represent original determination, an 
instrument for enhancing of the mutual trust and simultaneously, a 
complementary factor on the accession road of the Republic of Macedonia 
towards EU and NATO. Establishing of comprehensive cooperative 
relations with all countries in the immediate and wider neighborhood—both 
at bilateral plan and within regional initiatives and projects through 
participation in the existing initiatives for regional cooperation in the entire 
region of South East Europe, represents an active contribution of the 
Republic of Macedonia in the creation of relations of security, stability and 
cooperation in Southeast Europe. Republic of Macedonia is continuously 
engaged in promoting and further enrichment of the relations with 
democratically committed countries with which it has to great extent 
traditionally good and developed relations. Republic of Macedonia actively 
participates in the work of all relevant international organizations, as in 
global level—UN and of specialized agencies, WTO, and in regional 
organizations—OSCE, Council of Europe etc., as the most effective way of 
protecting of the world peace and security from the global threats of 
nowadays: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
organized crime, the preservation of a healthy environment, dealing with 
economic and social issues (non-) respect for human rights and more. The 
promotion of economic potentials and investment opportunities in the 
Republic of Macedonia, as well the development of active external 
economic policy is aimed at intensifying and qualitative enhancement of the 
bilateral economic relations with the countries of the region, Europe and the 
entire international community. On the basis of the importance of the 
national identity and values of the Macedonian people for the sovereignty, 
independence and security of the state, the Republic of Macedonia attaches 
great importance to the promotion of the national, cultural and spiritual 
identity outside the borders of the Republic of Macedonia. Concern for the 
position of the Macedonian communities living outside the national 
boundaries and for improvement of the legal status, and treatment of the 
Macedonian national minority in other countries, according to the 
international treaties and the concluded bilateral treaties and agreements, 
represents one of the most important foreign policy goals. Republic of 
Macedonia participates in peacekeeping missions (UN, NATO, EU) in 
support of peace, security and stability. Presently, Macedonia contributes 
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with about 240 people in international operations or about 3.5% of its own 
military forces. Republic of Macedonia participated with its troops in 
Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (Iraqi Freedom), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ALTHEA) and Lebanon (UNIFIL), and also provides logistical support to 
KFOR in Kosovo. Regarding the participation in international missions led 
by NATO, Republic of Macedonia received the highest marks from NATO, 
which sees our country as a stable military partner to the Alliance1. 
The process of recognition of the Republic of Macedonia started in 
1992. Since then until today, diplomatic relations with 170 countries have 
been established. Our country has established diplomatic relations with 
about 170 countries worldwide, and under its constitutional name, is 
recognized by over 130 countries including three permanent members of the 
Security Council—USA, Russia and China. Republic of Macedonia before 
exactly 22 years ago became the 181st full member of the United Nations. 
This act confirmed the will of the Macedonian people after the referendum 
on September 8, 1991 for a sovereign and independent Macedonia. Because 
of the opposition and pressure from Greece, which does not accept our 
constitutional name, the registration in the world organization was made 
under the interim reference Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia2. 
II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMBASSADORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIENNA 
CONVENTION AND THE LAW OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from 1961, signed in 
Vienna on April 18, 1961 came into force on April 24, 1964. 
A. In Accordance with the Vienna Convention the Diplomatic Officers 
Enjoy the Following Rights and Obligations 
Free movement and travel throughout the territory of the receiving 
State; 
Right of free communication with the Government of the sending state, 
through including diplomatic couriers and installing of wireless transmitters, 
but only with the consent of the receiving State; 
The receiving State shall protect the diplomatic official in the 
performance of his function who possess an official document of his status; 
                                                 
1 Available at http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=263, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Macedonia, opened on July 27, 2012. 
2 Available at http://mrt.com.mk/node/22051, Macedonian Radio Television, opened on August 25, 
2015. 
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Diplomatic officials who possess an official document that confirms 
their status are not subject to any form of arrest or detention and the 
receiving State shall take all necessary measures to protect his person; 
Shall guarantee inviolability of the private residence and protection of 
the premises of the mission; 
Diplomatic officers enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution; 
Immunity does not prevent the receiving State for his extradition to the 
sending State; 
On the entry into the receiving State, the baggage of the diplomatic 
official and his family is exempt from inspection; 
The diplomatic officials begin to use the privileges and immunities 
from the entrance to the receiving State until its abandonment; 
In case of the death of a member of the mission, the members of his 
family shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities to which they 
are entitled until the expiry of a reasonable period in which to leave the 
country; 
The diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practise for 
personal profit any professional or commercial activity; 
The receiving State is obliged in case of armed conflict to protect the 
premises of the mission; 
B. Pursuant to the Law on Foreign Affairs (“Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Macedonia” No. 46/06 and 107/2008) 
According to Article 26 of the Law: 
The Embassy and Liaison Office besides the functions stated in the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, perform the following 
functions: 
Represent and plead the Republic of Macedonia in the receiving State; 
Protects the interests of the Republic of Macedonia and its citizens and 
legal entities and perform consular and legal affairs; 
Promotes and develops the relations and overall cooperation between 
the Republic of Macedonia and the receiving State for the interests of the 
Republic of Macedonia; 
Participate in the negotiations with the government of the receiving 
State and other state institutions; 
Monitor the internal and external position and activity of the receiving 
State and shall inform the Ministry about that, which forward the 
information to the President and; 
Notify the authorities, institutions and public of the receiving State 
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about the positions and the development of the Republic of Macedonia; 
Monitor the current economic policy of the receiving State and 
regularly inform the Ministry that, forward information to the competent 
institutions in the Republic of Macedonia and; 
Promote Republic of Macedonia on economic plan in the receiving 
State and present the opportunities and advantages of investing in 
coordination and cooperation with the economic promoters from the 
Republic of Macedonia located in the receiving State, with the Agency for 
Foreign Investments of the Republic of Macedonia and the ministers in 
charge of foreign investments. 
Embassy and Liaison Office develop their work on political, economic, 
security, cultural, scientific-technical, informational and other field. 
The Embassy and Liaison Office devote special care to the status and 
human rights of the Macedonian people in the neighboring countries and to 
the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. 
According to Article 35 of the Law: 
The head of the diplomatic and consular missions shall perform the 
following duties: 
Organize the work of the diplomatic and consular mission, classifies 
tasks and undertakes measures in relation to matters within the jurisdiction 
of the mission; 
In accordance with the regulations takes care for the fulfillment of the 
rights and obligations of officers in the mission; 
Decide for financial and material operations of the mission within the 
budget of diplomatic and consular missions and; 
Perform other duties in accordance with the regulations and 
instructions of the Minister. 
According to Article 48: 
Besides the duties of diplomatic and consular officers stipulated in this 
law, the Ambassador shall be obliged to: 
Act in accordance with the established foreign policy of the Republic 
of Macedonia; 
Contributes to the strengthening of the relations with the receiving 
State or international organization and; 
Manages with the mission in which he was appointed; 
Act in accordance with the instructions and directions of the Minister. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the activities of the holders of the foreign policy of the 
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Republic of Macedonia indicates the conclusion that, in the process of 
exercising of its own foreign policy priorities, our country in the past years 
from its independence until today is guided by the fundamental tenets of the 
constitution, and the laws and principles of the activities in the states in the 
United Nations. 
The objectives of the foreign policy of the Republic of Macedonia in 
the past years have been carried out by the office holders who were elected 
in free, fair and democratic elections, but they have remained substantially 
unchanged. However, in view of the characteristics of the individuals who 
carried out these functions over the years, differences are observable. 
The development of democracy in the independent states that, were 
created after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe had a great influence 
on this, the approach in duty performance from the aspect of ideological and 
political profile and of course, the global changes taking place in the 
international community. 
The Republic of Macedonia in the implementation of foreign policy is 
guided by the respect of the Charter of the United Nations, resolving 
conflicts, disputes and open-issues between the countries peacefully, 
adherence to the international and legal principle for invariability of the 
borders, respecting of the policy for promotion of the body on Human rights 
and freedoms, supporting of the disarmament efforts and ban on all weapons 
of mass destruction, support for the promotion of the international economic 
relations in conditions of economic globalization. 
The Institute of International Recognition is one of the instruments for 
developing of the cooperation with other countries based on mutual interests. 
This institute “recognition of States” is known from the League of Nations 
and the United Nations. The legal effects of the recognition of states are 
limited if they are limited only to a declaratory act, but they can be both 
constitutive and more serious, if they are followed with the establishment of 
other legal and economic pressures, such as isolation or boycotts. 
It is important to emphasize that, the recognition of the states has no 
direct connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations, namely it 
can happen the state to be recognized, but not to establish diplomatic 
relations with it, while the reverse is not possible, since the establishment of 
the diplomatic relations implies recognition of that country. 
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PROVISION OF NURSING CARE WITH OR WITHOUT 
THERAPEUTIC COMMUNICATION INTERVENTION 
Treslova Marie & Pekara Jaroslav 
This paper acquires with provision of therapeutic communication in 
nursing in The Czech Republic. The survey sample was composed of two 
groups of 249 nurses and 169 patients from 7 hospitals in South Bohemia in 
Czech Republic. Results of qualitative and quantitative survey show the lack 
of necessary skills of therapeutic communication for provision of quality 
professional nursing care concerning prevention of unpleasant feelings 
connected with hospitalization which could lead to anger, aggression and 
violence. Also that patients and nurses are aware of the need for these skills 
which support patient’s well-being (balance), coping with aggressive 
behavior, identification of stress and depression and the emotional support. 
The most frequent communication skills is to give and to obtain information 
from patients and the less skills provided and missed by the patients 
respondents is “to react more to what they say (48.0%), to have more time 
for them (33.1%) and to listen to them more (25.1%). On the other hand, 
the conditions and the environment don’t offer possibilities for the nurses to 
spend required time with the patients. Also education of nurses, historical 
and cultural factors and theirs influence have to be taken into the account. 
Implementation of therapeutic communication as the obvious criteria of 
professional quality in nursing care is necessary. Discussion with 
educational institutions, managers, ministry authorities and insurance 
companies is one way for improvement of this situation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It was expected that, historical changes of the last 25 years will bring 
improvement into the professional nursing. But the care is still not 
comparable with countries in which development of this discipline was not 
interrupted due to the political system. There are very good educated and 
skilled technical nurses, but there is a big gap between theory and practice in 
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the field of psychosocial nursing interventions in Czech Republic. We 
apprehend that, nursing should relieve and contribute to man, who is the 
center of nurse’s work and who finds himself in the unknown environment 
with a feeling of failure or threat. This is the reason why we intensively pay 
attention to what patient experiences and what the nurse can do with and 
how she/he can use professional interventions to save the patient from 
unpleasant and uneasy experiences. Therapeutic communication is not 
explicitly defined in Czech nursing. Therefore there is a question how 
nurses intervene in case of stress situations to prevent aggressive or violent 
behavior of patients, caused by the new—unknown environment, 
procedures and provided care in the hospital. EU recommendations of 
nursing competences can be found in the Tuning project (Tuning 
Educational Structures in Europe)1, which also says that, the nurse should 
use a range of communication techniques to support patient well-being 
(balance), should be able to cope with aggressive behavior, identify stress 
and depression and give emotional support. This is of course underpinned 
with the holistic approach of nursing philosophy2 that is to meet all man 
needs included the psychosocial. So far though, nursing practice in Czech 
Republic does not fulfill this theoretical and ethical approach which is 
characteristic for this profession stated in ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses, or 
nursing process and nursing interventions in a satisfactory manner. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
Quantitative method in the form of self-constructed questionnaire 
based on the theory of therapeutic communication was used. Data were 
analyzed with SPSS 16 statistics program. Significance level of 5% and 
high significance of 1% were chosen, to which correspond p-values smaller 
than 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. This means that, of the p-level is smaller 
than 0.05, the hypothesis on independence does not apply as the dependent 
is hereby significant Semantic differential3 was use to find out how nurses 
tend to necessity, usage and effectivity of therapeutic communication using 
pairs of antonym adjectives on a 7-grade scale. The survey sample was 
composed of two groups of 249 nurses and 169 patients from 7 hospitals in 
South Bohemia in Czech Republic. The aim of the study was to find, what is 
                                                 
1 Tuning Educational Structures in Europe. Available at http://odur.let.rug.nl/TuningProject/, 
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2 BERMAN A., & SNYDER S., KOZIER AND ERBŚ FUNDAMENTS OF NURSING (New Jersey: Pearson 2012). 
ISBN 13: 978-0-13-802461-1. 
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the position for therapeutic communication in nursing care from the point of 
view of both nurses and patients; what skills of therapeutic communication 
the patients are missing; what obstacles nurses meet when providing 
therapeutic communication. 
II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Therapeutic communication is not explicitly defined in Czech nursing. 
To describe the term therapeutic communication, we searched in the foreign 
sources mostly. We understand the therapeutic communication as the “tool” 
(skill) or intervention for seeking the way to cope with obstacles connected 
with health prevention, support, disease, and also with dying. When 
thinking about the term therapeutic communication, we can consider a few 
opinions as follows: Rossiter4 defines this term and says that, “therapeutic 
communication is health promoting (p. 127)”. WHO generally describes 
“health” as well-being (balance). This indicates the aim and intended effect 
of therapeutic communication. Other authors define this communication as 
“patient orientated interactive process, including verbal and nonverbal 
behavior as indivisible and integral part of patient recovery5  s.9”. Also 
Joseph & Worsley6 deal with the patient-oriented inter-personal approach. 
It is logical that, hospitalized patients experience stress, uncertainty, 
the loss of safety and autonomy to a great degree.7, 8 Such exposure can lead 
a person to reactions far from reasonable, to an agitated state or aggressive 
behavior and possible violence. However, in these circumstances, such 
behavior should be recognized as a natural defense. When symptom as 
intense questioning, asking for favor, information, restlessness, agitation; 
changes in speech (speed, adequacy, voice, loudness) anger are detected the 
nurse should indicate nursing diagnoses as Anxiety; Defensive Coping; Fear; 
Decisional conflict, High risk for violence. 9 , 10  For these diagnoses, 
                                                 
4 Rossiter CH. M., Defining “Therapeutic Communication”, 25 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION. 127-
130 (2006). 
5 Jones J. S., Fitzpatrik. J., & Rogers V. L., Psychiatric-Mental Health Nursing: An Interpersonal 
Approach (New York: Springer 2012). ISBN 978-0-8261-0563-9. 
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CONGRESS ONVIOLENCE IN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 335-337 (Dwingeloo: Kavanah 2012). 
8 KŘIVOHLAVÝ J., PSYCHOLOGIE NEMOCI (Praha: Grada Publishing 2001). ISBN 80-247-0179-0. 
9 Herdman T. H., NANDA Ošetřovatelské Diagnózy: Definice & Klasifikace: 2012-2014 = Nursing 
Diagnoses : Definitions and Classification: 2012-2014 (Praha : Grada 2013). ISBN 978-80-247-4328-8. 
10 CARPENITO L. J., HANDBOOK OF NURSING DIAGNOSES (5th ed., Philadephia: Lippincott Comp 1993). 
ISBN 0-39755054-5. 
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appropriate interventions should be use as Use calm, reassuring approach; 
Assess psychological response to situation and availability of support 
system; be available to listen to patients feelings; Assist patient to properly 
express and relieve anger in appropriate ways; Encourage expression of 
feelings.11 
The results of our survey show that, even though nurses are unfamiliar 
with the term therapeutic communication to a high degree (59.0%) and they 
have not met it in practice (78.3%), they are aware of specific interventions 
such as listening (75.1%) and observing (43.8%). How can they answer like 
this when they are not familiar with the term? On the other hand, they think 
that, giving explanations (73.1%) comes under therapeutic communication 
while questioning is not seen as an effective therapeutic skill (35.7%). 
Burnard 12  and Crawrord, et al. 13  mention listening and questioning as 
fundamental for therapeutic communication that is to lead a person through 
the uneasy situation. So there is no way how to provide professional nursing 
care without therapeutic communication skills. To ensure that, the 
respondents will be clear about the term therapeutic communication we 
inserted a short explanation after a few introductory questions. 77.5% nurses 
think that, patients need therapeutic communication and 78.8% think that, 
therapeutic communication belongs to nursing care. The semantic 
differential showed inclination of respondents—nurses to the positive 
adjectives showing effectivity, usage and necessity of therapeutic 
communication on the 7-grade scale. 
Nurses mentioned the reasons for not providing therapeutic 
communication such as the lack of time (26.9%) also that, the patients do 
not know about this possibility (25.7%) and 45.8% nurses don’t know 
whether patients require therapeutic communication. How the nurses know 
their patients then? Could it be called professional care or quality care when 
the interventions meeting psychosocial needs are inadequate? The lack of 
time is also underpinned with the lack of personnel and immoderate 
documentation. Even if they would be skilled the actual conditions don’t 
allowed the provision of therapeutic communication. 
Empathy should be one of the nursing characteristic attitude and skill. 
It is obvious that, the experience of patients differs from nurse’s daily 
routine. We wanted to find out patients opinion and experience with 
                                                 
11 MCCLOSKEY J. C., & BULECHEK G. M., NURSING INTERVENTIONS CLASSIFICATION (NIC). (St.Louis: 
Mosby-Year Book 1992). ISBN 0-8016-6701-1. 
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Nelson Thornes Ltd. 2001). ISBN 0 7487 3312 4. 
13 Crawford P. Brown, B., & Bonham P., Communication in Clinical Settings, FOUNDATIONS IN 
NURSING AND HEALTH CARE (Andover: Centage Learning EMEA 2006). ISBN 978-0-7487-9716-5. 
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therapeutic communication provided by nurses. Patient respondents stated 
that their need for therapeutic communication is very strong (16.7%) or 
strong (51.9%). They experience that, the reason for nurses communicating 
with them is to inform them (42.3%) and to obtain information (34.3%). 
Only 21.1% patients stated that, the reason for communication is to find out 
what worries them, and 10.9% to encourage them. Clearly, information 
given could sooth uncertainty and anxiety of the patient in many situations, 
it is however up to the nurse to reason whether more communication skills 
are needed in each particular case.14 
The same as nurses, patients see their lack of time of (52.7%) as an 
obstacle for application of therapeutic communication by the nurses. 
Nevertheless patients would like the nurses to react more to what they say 
(48.0%), to have more time for them (33.1%) and to listen to them more 
(25.1%). These answers prove the importance of the mentioned fundamental 
therapeutic communication skills stated in 15  Nursing Interventions 
Classification. To be able to listen the proper environment and conditions 
are necessary (calm, with no rush, sit down, not showing that there are other 
tasks to be done etc.). To listen however, the nurse needs time to recognize 
what could be “hidden” behind the words the patient expresses. 
Statistically, the hypothesis that, preoccupation of nurses is according 
to the patients bigger obstacle to realization of therapeutic communication 
than their own bashfulness to ask the nurse for deeper conversation (p = 
0.046) was confirmed in case of respondents—patients up to 45 years of age 
and hospitalized up to one week. For the respondents older than 45 years 
and hospitalized more than one week, this hypothesis was not verified. Also 
the hypothesis that, nurses use therapeutic communication to provide 
information more often than other characteristic skills was not verified 
(listening p = 0.018; questioning p = 0.016). The hypothesis that, the 
obstacle for therapeutic communication is the shortage of time that nurses 
can spend with each patient was verified (p = 0.046). 
In the context of historical and cultural tradition, work with feelings 
and their impact on the quality of care or agitation, aggression differs from 
western countries. The expression of feeling or the will to ask the question: 
“Would you like to talk about it?” is not natural or common still. More often 
directive approach is used to obtain or to give information to be able to 
ensure and provide required administrative process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Obtained results brought the facts about the reality in Czech nursing 
practice regarding unsatisfactorily applied nursing skill—therapeutic 
communication. Although it is theoretically tangible and according of many 
authors, it is the key nursing skill, there is not much space for its realization 
in practice. The findings show that, therapeutic communication provided by 
nurses is needed and useful. Most important and effective skills of 
therapeutic communication are missing, especially listening, questioning 
and arranging the effective environment. The radical obstacle is the lack of 
time seen both from the nurses’ and from patients’ points of view. Therefore, 
during qualification education as well as lifelong learning of nurses, more 
attention should be paid to the area of therapeutic communication. Also to 
open discussion with managers, ministry authorities and insurance 
companies about including therapeutic communication as the obvious 
criteria of professional quality in nursing care is necessary. 
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THE FUNCTION PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA AND LEADING OF THE MACEDONIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Aneta Stojanovska-Stefanova∗ & Drasko Atanasoski∗∗ 
The latter principle of the fundamental values of the constitutional 
order of the Republic of Macedonia is respect of the generally accepted 
norms of international law. Namely, with the belonging of the international 
community, each state as a unitary and federal falls under the authority of 
the rules or standards of behavior that are built in that community. Foreign 
policy and international relations of each country are conditioned with its 
internal policy and with the basic features of the political system. Besides, 
the principles and objectives of the foreign policy and international 
relations are expression and effect of its internal politics, i.e. the basic 
social relations that determine the physiognomy and character of the basic 
political institutions, and the content and purposes of the political decisions. 
Chapter VI of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is dedicated to 
the issue whereby clearly and unequivocally is indicated that, for proper 
functioning of the democratic state, it is important how the internal as well 
as the issues of the international relations are regulated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the Law on Foreign Affairs 1  precisely are defined, the 
responsibilities of authorities for performing of the foreign work. With the 
same prescriptive in details normatively is determined, the whole process of 
creation, establishment and implementation of the foreign policy, as well as 
the relations between the authorities conducting foreign affairs and the state 
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government authorities, in the exercising of the foreign affairs, which 
reduces the possibility of overlapping or dysfunction. Characteristic of the 
Law on Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia is that, besides the 
traditional approach towards creating such a norm, it emphasizes the role of 
the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Also, by the law, it is determined the jurisdiction, structure and operation 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which before the adoption of the law was 
governed by one member of its competence and the Law on the organization 
and operation of the state administration authorities, i.e. some members in 
the same law for competences of the management authorities. The great part 
of the matter for the essential elements of the organization and work of the 
Ministry before the adoption of the law were moved by-laws. 
Furthermore, the law defines the diplomatic and consular representations 
that Republic of Macedonia can open abroad, and the procedure and 
conditions of appointment of the head of the diplomatic-consular office. More 
precisely is determined the procedure for revocation of the heads of the 
missions, and their duties, responsibilities and relations with the authorities 
for performing of the foreign works. Determined are specific duties and 
diplomatic-consular officers working in diplomatic-consular offices. 
The Law on Foreign Affairs in Article 2, precisely determines and 
delimits the terms foreign affairs and foreign policy. 
The term “foreign affairs” refers to actions performed by the competent 
authorities of the state government and the state government management in 
the exercise and protection of the rights and interests of the Republic of 
Macedonia in the international relations with the countries, international 
authorities, organizations and communities. 
While the term “foreign policy” refers to political objectives and 
activities of the Republic of Macedonian relations with countries and with 
international authorities, organizations and communities that protects the 
interests of the Republic of Macedonia in the international relations and 
protect the interests of its citizens and the legal entities registered in it. 
In determining the term head of state or President meet in more terms. 
“The head of the state is the authority that represents the state in the country 
and abroad, namely, it represents the state unity and independence, whereupon it 
is not important whether it is a monarch or head of state in the country in the 
republican establishment, as regardless of whether it is for independent or 
collective body.”2 
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The term head of state means the authority that has significant powers, 
but is not a holder of the supreme, legally unlimited power, which belongs 
to the principle of the Constituent and/or legislative body.3 
Another group of theorists define the head of state, as an individual or 
corporate body who embodies the political community and the long duration 
of the state, and performs ceremonial functions related with the representing 
of the country at home and abroad.4 
The procedure for the election of the President of the Republic of 
Macedonia is regulated in the Articles 80 and 81 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia5 and the Electoral Code.6 
The President of the Republic of Macedonia is elected by direct and 
immediate elections, by secret ballot, for a period of five years. 7  For 
President of the Republic, a same person can be elected mostly twice. The 
secondary election is not necessarily to proceed to the previous term, as is 
the case (e.g., NB) with the Constitution of Slovenia from 1991.8 
The powers of the President of the Republic of Macedonia in the 
execution of the foreign affairs are defined in Article 5 of the Law on 
Foreign Affairs, according to which the President of the Republic of 
Macedonia: represents the country in the international relations, in 
accordance with the international law and its responsibilities; participates in 
the creation of the foreign policy in cooperation with the Government, 
through the establishment of general guidelines on the foreign policy, 
including issues of the international relations with implications on security 
and defense of the country; monitors the implementation of the foreign 
policy and the results and any disagreements with other bodies for foreign 
affairs performing, can inform the Assembly; gives suggestions and 
participates in the pose of views on some foreign-policy matters within its 
competence, including the security and defense aspects arising from the 
international relations; appoints and dismisses by decree ambassadors and 
representatives of the Republic of Macedonia abroad, in procedure 
determined by this Law; gives consent to the issuance of agreement of the 
head of foreign diplomatic office and accepts the credentials and revoked 
                                                 
3 BAJALDZIEV DIMITAR, INTRODUCTION IN LAW-FIRST BOOK 92 255 (Evropa 1999). 
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letters of the foreign diplomatic representatives, in the procedure established 
by this law9. 
I. PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY 
The President of the Republic of Macedonia, as one of the pillars of the 
governance, holds executive powers, which mostly are focused in the hands 
of the Government. The relations of the Head of State with the Government 
and the Assembly are intertwined. Namely, the major powers in the field of 
the international relations, the President of the country performs in 
coordination with the Government and the Assembly of the Republic of 
Macedonia, and also should be noted that owns means of control over them, 
through the right to request to attend at the parliamentary session, right to 
veto acts adopted by the Assembly, the right to participate in the scheduled 
parliamentary session, and so on. 
In the mandate of the first President of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Kiro Gligorov formally and factually were established the foundations of 
the Macedonian foreign policy. President Gligorov in the formulation of 
foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Macedonia began from the basic 
conclusion, according to which in world frames even stronger swing takes 
the globalization and in the regional frames in the integration process. In his 
mandate, the President Gligorov established four key foreign policy 
priorities, first, the existence of the road to acquire and preserve with 
peaceful means the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, second, the 
Republic of Macedonia to become a factor and condition for stability and 
peace in the Balkans, and not “apple of discord”, third, to reject war and 
violence and to promote the European idea in the Balkans and fourth, to 
build relationships of equality with the neighboring countries and fifth, 
acceptance of the principles of moderation and realism in the conduct of the 
foreign policy. In the relations with the neighboring countries, the President 
Gligorov promoted the policy of equidistance which included readiness for 
a good cooperation with all neighbors, because it ensures the independence, 
territorial integrity and peace and security in the Balkans. 
The second president of the Republic of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski, 
left the concept of equidistance, formulated by his predecessor, and 
dedicated to strengthening the relations between the Republic of Macedonia 
and the United States, and the establishment of relations of Macedonia’s 
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integration into the European Union. The President Trajkovski considered 
that, the politics equidistance reflects the reservation and that this concept is 
indefinite, so hence he devoted himself to building internal Balkan 
cooperation which is complementary to the Euro-Atlantic integration. In this 
regard, the President Gligorov formulated the basic tenets to which he 
adhered to in performing the function: first, the Republic of Macedonia as a 
young country on its way to full integration in the international policy faces 
many challenges, secondly, the developmental internal and external 
processes require clearly defined, precise, well-coordinated and patient-
driven foreign policy, third, the success in the foreign policy is closely 
related to the success in the internal politics, fourth the unanimity and 
coordination in the implementation of the foreign policy represent a 
condition without which is not possible, achieving the smallest purposes. 
The third President of the Republic of Macedonia Branko Crvenkovski, 
in the part of the conducting of the foreign policy started from three basic 
settings, first, for further intensify and development of the relations of the 
Republic of Macedonia with neighboring countries, secondly, further 
upgrading of the strategic friendship of the Republic of Macedonia with the 
United States of America and third, continuing of the efforts for integration. 
According to the President Crvenkovski, the European Union integration of 
the Western Balkan countries at the same time is and the stabilization of the 
region, and closing of the historical chapter of mutual confrontation and 
conflict10. 
II. CURRENT MACEDONIAN PRESIDENT AND HIS VENTURE IN THE FOREIGN 
POLICY 
The fourth and current President of the Republic of Macedonia prof. 
Gjorge Ivanov, PhD, regarding the part of conducting of foreign policy, has 
established continuity of the fundamental goals of his predecessors, first, the 
European Union is unfinished project without the integration of the region, 
the Euro-Atlantic membership and policy of openness to all, the President 
Ivanov underlined them as leading points in the foreign-policy strategy of 
the country, stressing that, he will work dedicated to strengthening and 
deepening of the mutual trust and friendship with the countries from all over 
the world, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. Second aspect of 
the Macedonian foreign policy, which the President Ivanov has emphasized 
is the development of good neighborly relations and the contribution to the 
Macedonian stability and prosperity of the region. The third postulate to 
                                                 
10 Ibid, at 30. 
86                US-CHINA LAW REVIEW            Vol. 13: 81 
 
which the President Ivanov adheres is for firmly existence of the Republic 
of Macedonia in the way of regional cooperation, based on the principle of 
equality. President Ivanov is a leading expert in the field of civil society and 
among the very firsts to introduce systematic research of this area in the 
Macedonian academic society. He was a consultant to prominent think-
tanks and research centers. Generations of leaders have passed his training 
in political management. Professor Ivanov is one of the co-founders of the 
first Macedonian political science journal “Political Thought”. He is founder 
of the first Political Science Association in independent Macedonia. Ivanov 
is also one of the founders of the Institute for Democracy, Solidarity and 
Civil Society, a renowned Macedonian think-tank which has helped shape 
the political landscape in Macedonia and served as guide to many young 
talents in the politics. Although never a party member, Professor Gjorge 
Ivanov was active in designing the reform policy of the political party 
VMRO-DPMNE, the party that supported his presidential nomination at the 
2009 elections.11 
CONCLUSION 
The term head of state means the authority that has significant powers, 
but is not a holder of the supreme, legally unlimited power, which belongs 
to the principle of the Constituent and/or legislative body. 
The procedure for the election of the President of the Republic of 
Macedonia is regulated in the Articles 80 and 81 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia, and the Electoral Code. 
The President of the Republic of Macedonia is elected by direct and 
immediate elections, by secret ballot, for a period of five years. For 
President of the Republic, a same person can be elected mostly twice. 
We could conclude that, the powers of the President of the Republic of 
Macedonia in the execution of the foreign affairs are defined in Article 5 of 
the Law on Foreign Affairs, according to which the President of the 
Republic of Macedonia: represents the country in the international relations, 
in accordance with the international law and its responsibilities; participates 
in the creation of the foreign policy in cooperation with the Government, 
gives suggestions and participates in the pose of views on some foreign-
policy matters within its competence, including the security and defense 
aspects arising from the international relations; appoints and dismisses by 
decree ambassadors and representatives of the Republic of Macedonia 
                                                 
11 President of the Republic of Macedonia Dr. Gjorgje Ivanov, Available at 
http://president.mk/en/president/biography.html (last visited August 8, 2015). 
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abroad, in procedure determined by this Law; gives consent to the issuance 
of agreement of the head of foreign diplomatic office and accepts the 
credentials and revoked letters of the foreign diplomatic representatives, in 
the procedure established by the law. 

